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CONVICTION RECORD DISCRIMINATION
I. INTRODUCrION

Employment discrimination laws exist primarily to protect
populations that are prone to harmful discrimination or those that
historically have been discriminated against, thereby limiting their
opportunities in the labor market.
Implicit in these laws is a
determination that the trait or traits defining these populations are
largely unrelated to an individual's ability to successfully perform a job.
Yet in the quest to ensure that certain classes of people remain
protected from invidious discrimination, federal and state laws have
been created that have, either directly or indirectly, made persons with
criminal records a class to be protected from employment
discrimination. This development has thereby made criminal histories a
trait implicitly "unrelated" to job qualifications. The wisdom of this
development is questionable and, unfortunately, Wisconsin is the
jurisdiction that leads in this misguided jurisprudence.
Neither the federal government nor the vast majority of states
include within their fair employment or civil rights statutes a protection
against employment discrimination on the basis of criminal record.
Nonetheless, employers may violate federal civil rights laws if they
establish policies against employing persons with criminal records and
those policies have a verifiable disparate impact on minorities.4
Meanwhile, the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act (WFEA) expressly
bars employers from discriminating in employment decisions on the

1. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) ("The language of
Title VII [of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964] makes plain the purpose of Congress to
assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices
and devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of
minority citizens."); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 956-57 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(discussing Title VII's purposes); see also Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination:
Toward a Pluralistic Understanding of Workplace Harassment, 88 GEo. L.J. 1, 62 (1999)
("Title VII was enacted primarily to remedy discrimination against members of groups that
had historically been excluded from equal access to social, political, and economic power.").
2. See Wis. STAT. § 111.31(2) (1999-2000) (stating that employers should "evaluate an
employee or applicant for employment based upon the employee's or applicant's individual
qualifications rather than upon a particular class to which the individual may belong"); see
also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) ("What is required by Congress [in
Title VII] is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when
the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible
classification.").
3. See infra Parts II.B, II.C and accompanying notes.
4. Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975); see also infra Part II.C and
accompanying notes.
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basis of an employee's or applicant's criminal record.5 However, the law
also provides an important exception, which makes it lawful to
discriminate against those previously convicted of a crime if the
circumstances of the particular criminal offense "substantially relate" to
the circumstances of the particular job.6 In recent years, Wisconsin
lawmakers have considered removing conviction records from the
WFEA, therefore making it legal for employers to discriminate on the
basis of one's criminal history.7 In light of this development, it would be
helpful to determine whether such a policy transformation is wise and,
furthermore, to examine the impact that this change would have on
employment decisions in Wisconsin involving previously convicted
criminals.
This Comment addresses such questions by examining the general
efficacy and desirability of the WFEA's provision against discrimination
on the basis of conviction records, including its "substantial relation"
exception. Part II provides a general overview of the current law with
respect to criminal record considerations in employment decisions. It
details how Wisconsin law governs this issue and how administrative
agencies and courts have interpreted and applied the Act's ambiguous
provisions Part II also briefly describes how other jurisdictions address
the permissibility of considering criminal records in employment
decisions, highlighting the divergent rationales, details, and practical
impacts of each approach. 9 Furthermore, the final section of Part II
offers a brief overview of how the Federal Civil Rights Act, which
governs employment discrimination issues in the absence of state laws to
that effect, considers employment polices regarding criminal records."

5. WIS. STAT. § 111.321.

6. Id. § 111.335(1)(c). The statute reads:
[Ilt is not employment discrimination because of conviction record to refuse to
employ or license, or to bar or terminate from employment or licensing, any
individual who: (1) Has been convicted of any felony, misdemeanor or other offense
the circumstances of which substantially relate to the circumstances of the particular
job or licensed activity; or (2) Is not bondable under a standard fidelity bond or an
equivalent bond where such bondability is required by state or federal law,
administrative regulation or established business practice of the employer.
Id.
7. See infra Part II.A.2.c and accompanying notes.
8. See infra Part II.A and accompanying notes.
9. See infra Part II.B and accompanying notes.
10. See infra Part II.C and accompanying notes.
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Part HI of this Comment analyzes the WFEA criminal record
provisions, discussing whether the law is well-founded from a legal
standpoint." This analysis delves into the fundamental differences
between conviction records as an impermissible basis for employment
discrimination versus the other personal attributes from which states
and the federal government bar discrimination. This Comment then
examines whether the WFEA conviction record provision, and
specifically its substantial relation exception, is truly workable in a
consistent and meaningful manner.'2 These analyses will compare and
contrast the WFEA criminal record provision with the existing federal
jurisprudence on this issue of criminal record considerations in
employment. Such a comparison is important because, in the absence of
a state, law provision on criminal record consideration in employment
decisions, federal law governs claims brought on these discrimination
grounds. 3
This Comment concludes that Wisconsin should eliminate the
conviction record basis for an employment discrimination claim.
Furthermore, such an alteration of the WFEA would not undermine the
most legitimate basis for questioning the use of criminal records in
employment decisions-that of a disparate impact on otherwise
protected classes, namely racial minorities, which would still retain
adequate protection under available federal law.
II. CURRENT STATUS OF THE LEGALITY OF CONVICTION RECORD
CONSIDERATION IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS

A. Wisconsin's FairEmployment Act

1. General Provisions, Purpose, and Enforcement
Wisconsin maintains one of the most comprehensive statutes in
regard to fair employment practices and the disallowance of
employment discrimination.'4 The WFEA lists fourteen prohibited

11. See infra Part III.A.
12. See infra Part III.B.
13. See infra Part III.D.
14. For a summary of employment discrimination laws, and the relative amount of
practices and populations covered, see 1 MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW
§ 2.51 (2d ed. 1999).
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bases for discrimination. 5 Many of these are similar or identical to
those found within the equal employment opportunities laws of other
states, including such individual attributes as age, race, creed, color,
disability, sex, national origin, ancestry, and marital status. 6 Yet,
Wisconsin's other six prohibited bases for discrimination are relatively
unique,'7 and include reserve service in the military or national guard,
arrest record, conviction record, sexual orientation, and the "use or
nonuse of lawful products off the employer's premises during
nonworking hours. "18
The WFEA was enacted to help eliminate the practice of denying
employment and other social opportunities to individuals on the basis of
certain non-vocational characteristics and to curtail the ancillary
negative effects that such practices incur on citizens of the state. 9
Generally speaking, and in the words of the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
the WFEA is "a broad-based effort to eradicate many sources of
employment discrimination. "20 The Act specifies several purposes that

underlie the law and should guide its application, including: (1) that such
discrimination "substantially and adversely affects the general welfare of
the state" and will "deprive [properly qualified people who are being
discriminated against] of the earnings that are necessary to maintain a
just and decent standard of living"; 2' (2) "to encourage employers to
evaluate an employee or applicant for employment based upon the
employee's or applicant's individual qualifications rather than upon a
particular class to which the individual may belong" ;°' and (3) to "foster
to the fullest extent practicable the employment of all properly qualified
15. WIS. STAT. §§ 111.321,111.36 (1999-2000).
16. Nearly all states that have a statutory law against employment discrimination cover
age, race (or color), sex, religion (or creed), age, and handicap. See 1 ROTHSTEIN, supra note
14, § 2.51. Twenty states (including Wisconsin) include marital status protection from
employment discrimination, and nineteen (including Wisconsin) include ancestry protection.
Id. The exception is Alabama, which has no comprehensive act prohibiting employment
discrimination. See id.
17. See id (listing all the areas covered by states' general employment discrimination
statutes and showing the relative comprehensiveness of Wisconsin's coverage).
18. WIS. STAT. § 111.321. The Act also prohibits various forms of sexual harassment
and discrimination "on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, maternity leave or related medical
conditions." Id. § 111.36(1)(c).
19. See id. § 111.31.
20. County of Milwaukee v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 407 N.W.2d 908, 914 (Wis.
1987).
21. Wis. STAT. § 111.31(1).
22. Id. § 111.31(2).
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individuals" regardless of their status in one of the protected classes.2
The Act further states that its provisions should be liberally construed to
accomplish these general purposes.24 Overall, these stated purposes will
provide an important context for the subsequent discussion of how an
individual's status as a convicted criminal may substantively differ from
other individual attributes that are protected under the WFEA6
The WFEA prohibits various forms of discriminatory behavior
against persons due to their inclusion in one of the Act's protected
classes. The law prohibits refusals to hire, employ, promote, or
compensate; discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment; and, actions to bar or terminate from employment or
membership, if such discrimination is because the individual has one or
more of the protected attributes.' These prohibitions apply to public
and private employers, labor organizations, licensing agencies, and other
persons.'
Administration and enforcement of the WFEA is assigned to
Wisconsin's Department of Workforce Development (DWD).2 Persons
wishing to allege that they have experienced unlawful discrimination as
defined under the WFEA must first state a claim with the DWD.2 ' Such
an action will usually result in a hearing and eventual ruling as to the
merits of the claim by an administrative law judge (ALT) within the
Equal Rights Division of the DWD.3 Decisions by an ALT can then be
appealed to the Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC), which
conducts a review of the evidence previously submitted before the ALT
and decides whether to affirm, reverse, or modify the decision, or to

23. Id. § 111.31(3).
24. Id.
25. See infraPart 1I.A.
26. WIS. STAT. § 111.322(1). The Act also prohibits various means of expressed or
implied limitations, specifications, or discrimination against any of the protected classes. Id.
§ 111.322(2). These limitations are aimed at restricting both the ability of employers to learn
of traits that could be used for unlawfully discriminatory purposes, and the implication to
applicants or employees that such discriminatory practices might occur. Id. Finally, the Act
also prohibits retaliation against someone who opposes a proscribed discriminatory practice,
and the use of lie detectors and other forms of honesty testing. Id. §§ 111.322(3), 111.37.
27. Id. § 111.325.
28. Id. § 111.375.
29. Id. § 111.39(1). All remedies for violations made under the WFEA must initially be
pursued administratively. Bachand v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 305 N.W.2d 149,153 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1981).
30. WIS. ADMIN. CODE, ch. LIRC §§ 1.02,4.01 (2001).
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direct further hearings or other proceedings. 3' Decisions made by the
LIRC may be appealed to the circuit court in the county where the
petitioner resides,' at which point the issues in the case are addressed
and appealed in a procedural manner consistent with other civil law
claims.33
The nature of this process has important ramifications on
employment discrimination claims, both generally and specifically for
those claims based on allegations of improper use of conviction records,
because claims are filtered through an administrative agency that
develops a very particularized and specialized knowledge. Moreover,
most discrimination claims are settled before ever reaching the circuit
court.34 As a result, the DWD, and the LIRC in particular, have great

latitude and responsibility in determining the standard by which the
WFEA is enforced. Judicial oversight in this area is sometimes

minimal-but, as will be shown below, it can have an important impact
on the resulting efficacy of the law.
2. Conviction Record
One of the prohibited reasons for discrimination under the
Wisconsin Fair Employment Act is that of an employee's or applicant's
conviction record.35 Use of this characteristic, along with arrests not
resulting in convictions,36 as a reason to deny equal employment
31. WIS. STAT. § 111.39(5).
32. See Wis. ADMIN. CODE, ch. LIRC § 4.04(1).
33. The exception in this procedure is that the standard of review upon appeal requires
each successive court to review de novo the ruling of the LIRC decision. See Knight v. Labor
& Indus. Review Comm'n, 582 N.W.2d 448, 453 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (stating "we
substantively review LIRC's decision and not that of the circuit court") (citing Johnson v.
Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 547 N.W.2d 783,785 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996)).
34. From 1995-1998, the LIRC resolved 4771 cases involving Equal Rights matterswhich are mostly cases arising under the WFEA. Wis. LEGIS. AUDIT BUREAU, HEARING
OFFICERS IN STATE GOVERNMENT 36 (June 2000). Of those resolved decisions, only 489
were appealed, of which only 35 (or 7.2%) actually reversed the decision of the LIRC. Id.
This also means that of the original 4771 LIRC decisions, only 0.7% were eventually reversed
on appeal in the courts.
35. Wis. STAT. § 111.321. A conviction record is defined as including, but not limited to,
"information indicating that an individual has been convicted of any felony, misdemeanor or
other offense, has been adjudicated delinquent, has been less than honorably discharged, or
has been placed on probation, fined, imprisoned, placed on extended supervision or paroled
pursuant to any law enforcement or military authority." Id. § 111.32(3).
36. This Comment focuses almost exclusively on matters of discrimination related only
to conviction record, as opposed to both conviction and arrest record. In many respects, the
analyses of both bases of discrimination are similar, but they diverge on many important
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opportunities was first prohibited by the Wisconsin Legislature in 1977,3
thirty-two years after the original Wisconsin Fair Employment Act was
enacted. 8 The following text explains the parameters of the WFEA
conviction record bar, the treatment of the law in the courts, especially
the various interpretations applied to its substantial relation exception,
and a brief explanation of the law's precarious existence.
a. Statutory Directives and Exceptions

One articulated purpose for the prohibition against discrimination
on the basis of conviction records is to prevent the stigma of a criminal
record from completely swaying employment decisions. Others have
suggested that such protection is required to aid in the rehabilitation of
ex-felons and other offenders, and to provide them with the means to
gainful employment, which is considered fundamental for ensuring that
these persons do not revert to crime. 4'

Yet the WFEA also includes a critical exception, which states that
points, especially with regard to analysis under Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to e-17 (1994 & Supp. 2000). Further, most courts and commentators
believe that it is generally more permissible for employers to consider conviction records than
arrest records, since the former are more probative of guilt. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,
719 n.6 (1976) (quoting Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232,241 (1957)); Stephen F.
Befort, Pre-Employment Screening and Investigation" Navigating Between A Rock and A
Hard Place, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. LJ.365 (1997). "Courts generally are less tolerant of an
employer's use of arrest records, as opposed to conviction records.... Conviction records are
more reliable than arrest records because the criminal justice system has established that
misconduct actually occurred." Befort, supra, at 405; see also infra Part II.B.1.b.
This focus on only conviction record provisions is made for two reasons. First, under
recently proposed changes to Wisconsin's Fair Employment Act, the law would permit
discrimination on the basis of conviction records, yet would still restrict the use of arrest
records. See infra Part II.A.2.c. Second, the deletion of the use of arrest records as a
prohibited basis for employment discrimination is a less-compelling need than the deletion of
the conviction record bar. In this regard, the substantial relation exception also should apply
differently precisely because of the different nature of arrest records (not based on a
evidentiary finding of guilt) and conviction records (based on the finding of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt). See infra Part III.B.1.b. Nonetheless, many of the arguments offered for
elimination of the conviction record provision of the WFEA may apply to the arrest record
provision; they would just apply with less force.
37. 1977 Wis. Laws 619.
38. The original Wisconsin Fair Employment Act was enacted in 1945. 1945 Wis. Laws
861. It included only race, creed, color, national origin, and ancestry as bases protected from
discrimination. Id.
39. See Miller Brewing Co. v. Dep't of Indus. Labor & Human Relations, 308 N.W.2d
922,927 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981).
40. See County of Milwaukee v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 407 N.W.2d 908, 915
(Wis. 1987); see also infra Part flI.B.
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otherwise-prohibited discrimination based on conviction records is
permissible if the circumstances of the criminal offense, which may be a
"felony, misdemeanor or other offense[,] ...substantially relate to the

circumstances of the particular job."' 41 This exception is in line with the
general jurisprudence on employment discrimination law, which has
traditionally allowed exemptions that enable otherwise-prohibited
discrimination if bona fide occupational qualifications justify such
practices. 42
b. The "SubstantialRelation" Test
i. Overview

The conundrum faced by employers, administrative law judges,
employment lawyers, the LIRC, and courts, all of which attempt to
apply the WFEA's conviction record provision, is largely found within
its nebulous "substantial relationship" exception. The exception is
extremely important because the level of generality applied to its
interpretation will determine the effective force, or lack thereof, of the
ban against consideration of conviction records in employment
decisions. Unfortunately, it has never been altogether clear just how
the exception is meant to apply, given its language."
Meanwhile, the state legislature has passed upon codifying any
criteria that should govern determining whether a substantial
relationship exists between the circumstances of a crime and a job in any
particular case. As a result, the various governmental entities and
courts charged with interpreting, administering, and enforcing the
WFEA have each articulated their own standard for reviewing claims of
discrimination based on criminal record.
41. WIS. STAT. § 111.335(1)(c)(1) (1999-2000).
42. See infra Part II.C.3.
43. See Jeffery D. Myers, Note, County of Milwaukee v. LIRC"Levels of Abstraction
and Employment DiscriminationBecause of Arrest or Conviction Record, 1988 Wis. L. REV.
891.
44. Interestingly, the statute does specify some very particular circumstances under
which conviction record discrimination is allowed. WIS. STAT. § 111.335(1)(cm) (allowing the
denial of employment to an applicant for employment as burglar alarm installer if that
applicant has been convicted of a felony and is not pardoned); WIs. STAT. § 111.335(1)(cg)
(allowing employment and licensing discrimination based on felony records against persons
involved in the field of private investigation and personal security); WIS. STAT.
§ 111.335(1)(cs) (allowing discrimination in the area of alcoholic beverage licensing based on
convictions involving controlled substances).
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ii. The Rise and Fall of the Factors-Specific Test45
The first few years after the inclusion of the conviction record
provision in the WFEA highlighted the need for determining how the
substantial relationship test should apply, and upon which parties the
burdens should fall when the exception is raised as a defense. Given the
procedural nature of claims based upon the WFEA,46 the early
responsibility for determining how the substantial relation exception
would apply was assumed by the administrative agencies assigned with
enforcing the law, namely the Labor and Industry Review Commission
(LIRC).
During the 1980s, the LIRC issued a series of opinions in cases in
which complainants alleged employment discrimination on the basis of
conviction record, and the application of the substantial relation
exception was a primary factor in the decisions.47 These cases provided
a composite of the factors to be considered by an employer when
determining whether an applicant's criminal record is of a relation
substantial enough to the job applied for, such that discrimination on
that basis would be permissible. These articulated factors included the
following: the public profile or nature of the applicant's job, the
principal duties of that job, the time that had elapsed since conviction,
mitigating circumstances involved in the crime for which the conviction
arose, evidence of rehabilitation, and, perhaps most important, the
number and seriousness of the crimes." These early LIRC decisions did
45. This characterization of the LIRC's pre-County of Milwaukee analysis as the
"factors-specific test" was coined by Myers, who referred to the analysis as a "factor-weighing
approach." Myers, supra note 43, at 898.
46. See supra Part II.A.I.
47. See Gumbert v. Ken Loesch Oldsmobile, Inc., ERD Case No. 8206448 (LIRC July 9,
1985); Johnson v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Milwaukee, ERD Case No. 7805675 (LIRC June 28,
1983); Gulbrandson v. City of Franklin, ERD Case No. 7905259 (LIRC July 2, 1981);
McVicker v. Milwaukee County Children's Court Ctr., ERD Case No. 8152283 (LIRC July 2,
1981).
48. See Gumbert, ERD Case No. 8206448 (finding that the short time since the
commission of multiple speeding convictions, the repetition of offenses, and disregard in
handling automobiles allowed for discharge of automobile repairman); Johnson, ERD Case
No. 7805675 (finding an impermissible consideration of conviction record for manslaughter
conviction for an assistant social worker, given mitigating circumstances in the crime, the lack
of a previous criminal record, and considerable rehabilitation efforts); Gulbrandson, ERD
Case No. 7905259 (finding as dispositive the recentness of the convictions, the repetition of
offenses, and the involvement of substance abuse in criminal offense, in the denial of a
bartender's license); McVicker, ERD Case No. 8152283 (deciding that the high public profile
and sensitive nature of the job applied for and the seriousness of convictions for false
representation in medical assistance weighed toward allowing denial of job as children's
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not assert that the preceding list of factors was exhaustive, thereby

further emphasizing the need for case-by-case determinations of both
the factors to be considered and their relative weight. A primary
consequence of this approach was that the statutory exception placed
upon employers the burden of establishing a significantly detailed
factual record in order to lawfully base their decision to discriminate
upon criminal records."
The substantial relation exception was
therefore narrowly drawn.
The LIRC's factors-specific test was eventually reviewed by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Law Enforcement Standards Board v.
Village of Lyndon Station50 and in Gibson v. Transportation

Commission."

In these two cases, the Wisconsin Supreme Court

exhibited its desire to use a broad interpretation of the substantial

relation exception. In Lyndon Station, a majority of the court found
that a substantial relationship did exist between the duty of a public law
enforcement officer and previous felony convictions for misconduct in
public office. However, this conclusion is perhaps less important than
the route that led the court to its determination. The court refused to
look into the specific factors surrounding the officer's case and instead
asserted that the trust and confidence required of such a public position
probation officer). For a more-detailed explanation of these cases and their role in the early
interpretation of the WFEA's conviction record bar, see Myers, supra note 43, at 898-901.
49. See Myers, supra note 43, at 900.
50. 305 N.W.2d 89 (Wis. 1981). This case arose when the Law Enforcement Standards
Board (LESB) petitioned for a writ of mandamus to force the village of Lyndon Station to
discharge its chief of police, William Jessen. Id. at 93-95. Some years prior, the LESB had
refused to certify Jessen as a qualified law enforcement officer due to his conviction on
twenty-six felony counts of misconduct in public office, which largely involved the falsification
of traffic violations while he was chief deputy sheriff for Juneau County. Id. at 91-93. As a
result, Jessen was placed on a two-year probation, during which time the village subsequently
hired him as chief of police, even though it was aware of his previous criminal convictions. Id.
at 92. While no formal action was taken by the LESB in opposition to this hiring at the time
it occurred, the LESB reaffirmed its decision to deny Jessen recognition as a qualified law
enforcement officer. Id. at 92-93. The village maintained Jessen in his position as chief of
police for three years, at which time the LESB finally brought action to have him removed by
court order. Id. at 93. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed lower court rulings requiring
the village to discharge the chief of police due to his prior conviction record. Id. at 101.
51. 315 N.W.2d 346 (Wis. 1982). The Department of Transportation (DOT) had denied
Gibson a school bus driver's license based on his conviction for armed robbery two years
prior. Id. at 348. The LIRC upheld the DOT's refusal to grant Gibson a license; the Dane
County Circuit Court and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals both affirmed that decision. Id. at
347 (citing Gibson v. Transp. Comm'n, 309 N.W.2d 858 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981)). The Wisconsin
Supreme Court also affirmed the LIRC's decision. Id.
52. Lyndon Station, 305 N.W.2d at 99.
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would be shaken by his previous forms of misconduct. 3 Likewise, the
court did not require the LESB to investigate the factors involved with
the previous criminal conviction and the current job position in order to
establish a substantial relationship. In Gibson, the court continued this
logic, further articulating its understanding of the WFEA substantial
relation test for discrimination claims based on criminal conviction
record:
Our decision in this case does not mean that the particular
factual circumstances of the crime upon which a felony
conviction was based may never be relevant to a school bus
If this were the case, the
driver licensure decision.
"circumstances of which" language in sec. 111.32(5)(h)2b, Stats.,
would be superfluous and it is clear from the legislative history of
that statute that the legislature specifically intended to include
such language in the statute. However, just as a conviction of
falsifying traffic citations as a matter of law constitutes
circumstances which substantially relate to the job of police chief,
so does a conviction of the offense of armed robbery as defined
under Indiana law in and of itself constitute circumstances
substantially related to school bus driver licensure.54
This interpretation by the court showed a growing willingness to
look predominantly to the elements of the underlying crime being
considered as the appropriate reference of "circumstances" to compare
to the nature of the employment sought."
Justice Abrahamson was the lone dissenter in both Lyndon Station
and Gibson. Her analysis focused on whether specific factors found in
both the convictions and the current job would have justified
discrimination on the grounds of the conviction record. 6 In particular,
she would have had the court adhere to the LIRC approach and look to
many of the factors that seem to comprise the LIRC's standard of
Justice Abrahamson
review, including mitigating circumstancesY
argued that the majority opinion reduced the issue to merely the
53. Id.
54. Gibson, 315 N.W.2d at 349 (footnote omitted).
55. Id. at 348.
56. Lyndon Station, 305 N.W.2d at 101-10 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 109 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). In Jessen's case, those circumstances would
have been the fact that he had satisfactorily performed as police chief for seven years, and
that more than nine years had passed since his conviction. Id. at 108.
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presence of a conviction record, and not whether the conviction record
related to the capabilities of the individuals being denied employment or
licenses." In Gibson, Justice Abrahamson suggested the majority had
"rewritten the statute in a way which promotes additional litigation" by
ignoring both its direct language and legislative history.59 In essence,

Justice Abrahamson disagreed with both the majority's legal
conclusions and, perhaps more important, with the procedure and test it
employed to reach those results.
After these decisions, it was evident that a majority of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court was, at a minimum, apprehensive about reading the
substantial relation exception too narrowly, so as to make it difficult for
employers to deny employment based on an applicant's prior criminal
record. The LIRC factors-specific weighing test appeared to be
wobbling on weak legs.
iii. County of Milwaukee v. LIRC and the Elements-Oily Test

The factors-specific test previously adopted by the LIRC was
explicitly overruled by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1987 in County
of Milwaukee v. LIRC.:' In its place, the court established a much
broader exception that seemingly enables employers to more
comfortably and more frequently find lawful cause to discriminate
against employees and applicants based on their criminal record.
The complainant in County of Milwaukee, Steven Serebin, who held
a position as a crisis intervention specialist for the County of Milwaukee,
was terminated from employment after he was convicted of homicide by
reckless conduct and twelve misdemeanor counts of patient neglect
arising from actions taken during his previous employment as a nursing
home administrator."
The LIRC found that Serebin had been
58. Id. at 107-09.
59. Gibson, 315 N.W.2d at 350 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). In particular, Abrahamson
argued that the legislature would have written statutory language in the form of "felony...
the circumstances of which substantially relate" to the position sought, as opposed to the
actual language that refers to the "felony ... the elements of which substantially relate" to the
position sought, if it were to have intended the majority's interpretation. Id. (emphasis in
original).
60. 407 N.W.2d 908 (Wis. 1987).
61. Id. at 910. Serebin had been charged with fifty-eight counts of negligence toward
nursing home residents, plus the count of homicide from reckless conduct. See Serebin v.
Milwaukee County Mental Health Complex, ERD Case No. 8254772, slip op. at 2 (DILHR
Mar. 13, 1984). The Wisconsin Court of Appeals later reversed all of the convictions, but the
Wisconsin Supreme Court subsequently reinstated the misdemeanor counts. State v. Serebin,
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unlawfully discriminated against on the basis of his conviction record
and argued that his offenses as nursing home administrator gave no
indication of his ability to successfully perform his position as a direct
care provider. The LIRC's decision was subsequently affirmed by the
Milwaukee County Circuit Court and later the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals, both concluding that the circumstances of Serebin's conviction
were not substantially related to his employment duties as crisis
intervention specialist.'
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the LIRC's decision,
concluding that the County's termination of Serebin due to his
conviction record was lawful.6 In doing so, the court "conclud[ed], as a
matter of law, that the circumstances of the offenses for which Serebin
was convicted substantially relate to the circumstances of the job of
crisis intervention specialist."65 How the court arrived at this conclusion
is instructive in determining the current legal effect of the WFEA's
provision against discrimination on the basis of conviction record.
After stating that the basic question facing the court is the nature of
the inquiry required by the substantial relation exception,6 the majority
made clear its desire to dismiss the factors-specific test. According to
the court, "[w]e reject an interpretation of [the substantial relation] test
which would require, in all cases, a detailed inquiry into the facts of the
offense and the job." 67 Instead, the court held that assessing the
relationship between circumstances of a criminal offense and the
circumstances of a job requires only an inquiry into "the circumstances
which foster criminal activity that are important, e.g., the opportunity
for criminal behavior, the reaction to responsibility, or the character
traits of the person. "6 Moreover, the court defended its "elements338 N.W.2d 855 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983), affd in part,rev'd in part,350 N.W.2d 65 (Wis. 1984).
62. County of Milwaukee, 407 N.W.2d at 911 (quoting Serebin,ERD Case No. 8254772,
slip op. at 3).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 918.
65. Id. at 917-18 (emphasis added).

66. Id. at 909.
67. Id. at 916.
68. Id. In explicating this holding, the court stated:
Assessing whether the tendencies and inclinations to behave a certain way in a
particular context are likely to reappear later in a related context, based on the traits
revealed, is the purpose of the test. What is important in this assessment is not the
factual details related to such things as the hour of the day the offense was
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only" analysis previously established in Gibson,69 stating that such an

approach best effectuates the WFEA statutory provision."
Given the court's clear articulation of this test, it could then proceed

to apply the facts of the case so as to validate Milwaukee County's
decision to terminate Serebin.
Adopting Milwaukee County's
argument, the court stated:
[T]he "circumstances" of the offense and the job are similar since
in both contexts Serebin was in a position of exercising enormous
responsibility for the safety, health, and life of a vulnerable,

dependent segment of the population. The twelve misdemeanors
indicate a pattern of neglect of duty for the welfare of people
unable to protect themselves.

The propensities and personal

qualities exhibited are manifestly inconsistent with the
expectations of responsibility associated with the job.7'
committed, the clothes worn during the crime, whether a knife or a gun was used,
whether there was one victim or a dozen or whether the robber wanted money to
buy drugs or to raise bail money for a friend. All of these could fit a broad
interpretation of "circumstances." However, they are entirely irrelevant to the
proper "circumstances" inquiry required under the statute.
Id.
69. Gibson v. Transp. Comm'n, 315 N.W.2d 346 (Wis. 1982); see also supra Part
II.A.2.b(ii) and accompanying notes. The LIRC argued to the court that it believed the
Lyndon Station and Gibson precedent had established an "elements of the crime" standard,
which is what it was following in its decision against Milwaukee County. County of
Milwaukee, 407 N.W.2d at 913. Moreover, the court quoted from the commission's argument
that "[tihe difficulty with the court's analysis in [Lyndon Station] and Gibson is that it fails to
explain when the 'elements of the crime' standard should be used as opposed to the
.circumstances of the offense' standard." Id. (alteration in original). The court, in its
decision, eliminated this confusion by holding that the "elements of the crime" standard
governs all cases brought under a claim of discrimination based on conviction record.
70. 407 N.W.2d at 917 ("It appears that the 'elements only' test is not a test distinct from
the statutory test. Rather, focusing on the elements simply helped to elucidate the
circumstances of the offense.").
71. Id. This language echoes that found in Milwaukee County's brief for the case, cited
by the court earlier in its opinion, which claimed that:
Conviction of twelve counts of patient neglect strongly suggests a pattern of behavior
and an underlying attitude which resulted in Serebin's knowing failure to accept
responsibility for the needs of an extremely dependent, vulnerable population. The
patients whom Serebin would encounter as a crisis intervention worker either on the
telephone or in the field would surely be similarly vulnerable and dependent.
Serebin's inclination and ability to deal responsibly and professionally with their
needs is, by any common sense analysis, substantially related to his criminal
dereliction as a nursing home administrator.
Id. at 913.
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This language comports nicely with the principle the court
established regarding the need to inquire into whether circumstances
that "foster criminal activity" exist within the job held by the person
with a criminal record. Although admitting that specific facts in any
case may play a role in this inquiry n the court appears to have seen a
significant degree of similarity between the nature of a crime, as defined
through its elements, and the nature of a job, as defined through the
duties of a job.
Once again, Justice Abrahamson disagreed with the majority's
logic-or, more precisely, with its premises. Although she concurred
with the decision, Abrahamson argued that the majority's opinion had
over-generalized the nature of the "circumstances of the offense"
analysis in such a way that resulted in an "eviscerated statute."73 She
sharply disagreed with the majority's view that "[w]hether an individual
can perform a job up to the employer's standards is not the relevant
question."' 74 Abrahamson argued instead that one of the purposes of the
WFEA restriction is precisely "to prohibit an employer from prejudging
an applicant's or employee's suitability for a job on the basis of a
conviction record."75
iv. Subsequent Developments: Wading Through Administrative Law
and Lower Court Decisions
Since County of Milwaukee, the LIRC has had multiple occasions to
apply this elements-only analysis to claims brought on grounds of
discrimination based on conviction records. These decisions have built
upon the legal principles articulated in County of Milwaukee and have
fleshed out some nuances, while also providing a growing list of76
decisions filling in the conviction/job "substantial relation" matrix.
First, these decisions have ruled that the circumstances of a conviction
72. Id. at 916 (explaining that disorderly conduct crimes, for example, may require an
inquiry into the facts surrounding the crime to determine the crime's relationship to the job).
73. Id. at 919.
74. Id. at 917.
75. Id. at 919.
76. By this phrase I mean the issue of whether, as a matter of law, a particular job will be
deemed substantially related to a particular crime or set of crimes. While one can speculate
as to which jobs and crimes "substantially relate"-which is precisely the type of speculation
that employers must engage in in the absence of a court decision specifically comparing a
particular job to a particular crime-the legal determination of such numerous connections is
not made until a case presents itself based on a formal complaint.
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arising out of an employee's conduct while under duty for the employer

is per se substantially related to the job." The LIRC has also ruled that
certain factors are not material to the application of the substantial

relation test.
These irrelevant factors include the mitigating
circumstances since the conviction, 8 the passage of time since the last
criminal offense, 71 the fact that an applicant appears able to successfully
° and that an applicant has received a governor's
perform the job,W
pardon for the crime.8 ' These are precisely the type of factors that were

critical to a substantial relationship assessment during the factorsspecific, pre-County of Milwaukee days."

A key principle that the LIRC has articulated since County of
Milwaukee is that the "substantially related" test is intended to be an

objective test, applied after the fact by a reviewing tribunal, and is not to
be applied against any subjective intention of the employer at the time it
makes its employment decision.83 This interpretation means that it is
irrelevant if an employer fails to actually inquire into whether any
substantial relationship exists; rather, the sole issue is whether the

reviewing legal tribunal finds such a relationship exists in fact.'

This

77. See, e.g., Maline v. Wisconsin Bell, ERD Case No. 8751378 (LIRC Oct. 30, 1989)
(permitting the termination of a telephone service technician arrested for delivering cocaine
with a company van). This interpretation arose in the pre-County of Milwaukee days. See
Kozlowicz v. Augie's Pizzaria, ERD Case No. 8256201 (LIRC Dec. 7, 1983).
78. See, e.g., Ford v. Villa Maria Home Health Nursing Servs., ERD Case No. 9401033
(LIRC Nov. 17, 1995) (stating that while an employer is entitled to consider mitigating
circumstances occurring since an applicant's conviction, the WFEA does not require such an
assessment).
79. See, e.g., Nelson v. Prudential Ins. Co., ERD Case No. 9401390 (LIRC May 17, 1996)
(finding that the length of time between a conviction and the alleged discrimination is an
irrelevant consideration).
80. Id. slip op. at 3.
81. Cieciwa v. County of Milwaukee, ERD Case No. 8952249 (LIRC Nov. 19, 1992).
82. See supra Part II.A.2.b.ii.
83. Lillge v. Schneider Nat'l, Inc., ERD Case No. 199604807 (LIRC June 10, 1998); see
also Santos v. Whitehead Specialties, Inc., ERD Case No. 8802471 (LIRC Feb. 26, 1992);
Jorgensen v. HMI Ltd., ERD Case No. 8951025, slip op. at 6 (LIRC Oct. 25, 1991); Collins v.
Milwaukee County Civil Serv. Communications, ERD Case No. 8822724 (LIRC Mar. 8,
1991), affd in No. 91-2839 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 1992) (not to be cited as precedent or
authority per WIS. STAT. § 809.23(3) (1999-2000)); Black v. Warner Cable Comm. Co., ERD
Case No. 8551979 (LIRC July 10, 1989). See generally, BRADDEN C. BACKER ET AL.,
HIRING AND FIRING IN WISCONSIN § 1.8 (1998); ANN WASSERMAN, A GUIDE TO
WISCONSIN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 3.23 (1998).
84. Moore v. Overnite Transp. Co., ERD Case No. 9201293 (LIRC Oct. 13, 1994);
Jorgensen,ERD Case No. 8951025, slip op. at 4-5 ("[Tlhe 'substantially related' exception is
not a test by which one measures the subjective intent of the employer at the time it makes
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interpretation arguably takes the spirit of the County of Milwaukee
decision even further, by immunizing an employer from not taking the
lead in ensuring that it does not impermissibly discriminate on the basis
of criminal conviction records. A final ruling has determined that
employers who express that, under certain circumstances, they would
not hire individuals with conviction records have not unlawfully
discriminated because such a statement "is no more than a layman's
statement" of what is contained in the statute.'
Also in the spirit of County of Milwaukee, the LIRC has repeatedly
invoked the notion that what may ultimately be dispositive in
discrimination claims based on conviction records is an analysis of
whether the job sought will be performed in a setting inclined to tempt
the ex-convict to behave again in a criminal manner.86 This factor seems
especially pertinent for jobs involving a significant amount of
unsupervised workY Finally, under the WFEA, employers may inquire
about conviction records; yet, they must inform applicants that, in doing
so, any answers will not result in an absolute bar to employment, as well
as explain the limited circumstances where the inquiry will affect the
employment decision." If the applicant lies or falsifies a response to
the challenged decision; it is, rather, a test by which the legal correctness of the employer's
decision is measured by the ALT, the Commission, and the courts."); Collins, ERD Case No.
8822724.
85. Konrad v. Dorchester Nursing Ctr., LIRC Dec. No. 199603133, slip op. at 2 (LIRC
June 10, 1998) (referring to the substantial relation exception).
86. See, e.g., Rathbun v. City of Madison, ERD Case No. 199500515 (LIRC Dec. 19,
1996) (finding that a job as a taxi cab driver obviously gave person who was convicted of
sexual assault and threatening to injure another while in possession of a dangerous weapon,
opportunities to commit similar crimes); see also Goerl v. Appleton Papers, Inc., ERD Case
No. 8802099 (LIRC Oct. 22, 1992) (noting the County of Milwaukee test in stating that it is
the circumstances that foster criminal activity which are important).
87. See, e.g., Halverson v. LIRC, No. 87-2171, 1988 Wisc. App. LEXIS 674, at *2 (Wis.
Ct. App. Aug. 9, 1988) (unpublished, limited precedent decision under WIs. STAT.
§ 809.23(3)); Perry v. Univ. of Wis.-Madison, Wis. Pers. Comm'n Dec. No. 87-0036-PC-ER
(May 18,1989).
88. See BACKER ET AL., supra note 83, § 1.8.
If an employer chooses to inquire about pending arrests or convictions, either on an
application form or during an interview, the employer should make the disclaimer
that ... convictions are not an absolute bar to employment and that they will be
considered only if there is a substantial relationship to the circumstances of the
particular job....
Id.; see also Haynes v. Nat'l Sch. Bus Serv., ERD Dec. No. 8751901 (LIRC Jan. 31, 1992)
(recognizing that an employer can inquire into an applicant's conviction record so that the
employer is able to determine if the crimes in that record substantially relate to the
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such inquires, an employer may lawfully refuse to hire the applicant on
the basis of that falsification." Overall, the LIRC-reviewed cases since
County of Milwaukee have involved a case-by-case comparison of the
elements of the crimes committed and the job duties required, and a
survey of these LIRC decisions offers a plethora of examples of specific
applications.
In addition to LIRC administrative reviews, a few cases involving
the conviction record provision of the WFEA have reached federal
district courts" and Wisconsin's appellate courts, adding to the legal
understanding of the provision. In a series of unpublished opinions,9
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals has largely echoed County of
Milwaukee and the legal interpretations of the decision given by the
LIRC. 2 Within these opinions, it has been stated that while postconviction behavior may be relevant to one's ability to perform the job,
post-conviction events are not relevant to determining whether the
substantial relationship test has been met. 3 Further, the law has been
said to not require the employer to prove that there is an unreasonable
risk of the applicant repeating his criminal behavior.94 These decisions
have also adopted the understanding that the "substantially related" test
prospective job duties).
89. Haynes, ERD Case No. 8751901, slip op. at 10 (citing Miller Brewing Co. v. Dep't of
Indust. Labor & Human Relations, 308 N.W.2d 922 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981)).
90. See Tee & Bee, Inc. v. City of West Allis, 936 F. Supp. 1479, 1489-90 (E.D. Wis.
1996). The court found that a city ordinance, which rendered an applicant ineligible for a
license to operate an "adult bookstore" due to his prior convictions of a sex-related crime,
was substantially related, under the WFEA, to the concern being regulated. Id.
91. These currently unpublished decisions are obviously not discussed for their
precedential value, as they have none, but are used only to show how Wisconsin courts have
applied the WFEA after County of Milwaukee. Therefore, although they have no effect on
expanding the interpretation of the law, the cases provide examples of how certain fact
patterns have been handled by courts under the current law.
92. See, e.g., Nawrocki v. City of Milwaukee Fire & Police Comm'n., No. 91-0024, 1991
Wisc. App. LEXIS 1371, at *16-18 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 1991) (citing County of
Milwaukee's "substantially related" test in holding that Nawrocki's discharge based on his
fraudulent retention of funds from tenants living at his real estate housing is sufficiently
related to job as police officer) (unpublished, limited precedent decision under WIS. STAT. §
809.23(3)).
93. Collins v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, No. 91-2839, 1992 Wisc. App. LEXIS
904, at *12 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 1992) (unpublished, limited precedent decision under WIS.
STAT. § 809.23(3)) (finding that the circumstances of the offense of armed robbery are
substantially related to the circumstances of the position of Juvenile Correctional Worker)
(citing Law Enforcement Standards Bd. v. Vill. of Lyndon Station, 305 N.W.2d 89 (Wis.
1981)).
94. Id. slip op. at *12.

2002]

CONVICTION RECORD DISCRIMINATION

is not a test of the subjective intent of an employer, and employers need
not show that they had concluded at the time of the employment that
the circumstances of the offense and the particular job were
substantially related.95
However, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals has also found occasion
to disallow an employer's use of an employee's conviction for possession
of marijuana, where that employee worked as a stocker.96 In making this
decision, the court essentially agreed with the LIRC's conclusion that if
someone is "considered unsuitable for the stocker position based upon
the potential to distribute drugs, then it would appear that she could be
lawfully excluded from essentially every job which placed her in contact
with other workers or with the public."" The LIRC had concluded that
"[s]uch a result would be inconsistent with the goals of the [WFEA]."9"
In 1998, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals added some additional
insights in Knight v. LIRCY. The case involved an individual who had
previously been convicted of a drug crime and was applying for a
position as a district agent for Prudential Insurance Company of
America. Due to matters related to federal securities law, Prudential
kept a policy of summarily rejecting all applicants having a criminal
record that would disqualify that individual for National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) certification
Knight filed a complaint
under the WFEA. 1 An administrative law judge decided in favor of
Prudential, ruling that an employer is not required by the WFEA to
accommodate an applicant's criminal record in its hiring process.1" This
decision was subsequently affirmed by the LIRC and the Waukesha
County Circuit Court."
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals also affirmed, finding that
95. See, e.g., id.
96. Wal-Mart Stores v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, No. 97-2690, 1998 Wisc. App.
LEXIS 1529, at *9 (Wis. Ct. App. June 4, 1998) (unpublished, limited precedent decision
under WIS. STAT. § 809.23(3)).
97. Herdahl v. Wal-Mart Distrib. Ctr., ERD Case No. 9500713 (LIRC Feb. 20,1997).
98. Id.
99. 582 N.W.2d 448 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998), review denied, 585 N.W.2d 157 (Wis. 2001).
100. Prudential required all employees involved in the company's registered securities
business to be individually registered with the NASD. Id. at 451. Among other criteria,
federal law had established disqualification for persons to receive this registration if they have
received a felony conviction within the past ten years. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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Prudential had not improperly discriminated against Knight on the basis

of his conviction record.'' In making this decision, the court elaborated
on its view of what is required of such claims. First, the court agreed
with the language used in the lower court rulings, stating that nothing in
the WFEA requires employers to take affirmative actions to
accommodate individuals with felony convictions.

5

Second, the court

held that, to prevail under the WFEA, a complainant must prove that he
or she is truly qualified for the position,1" adding that this determination

is a question of fact.

7

The court then determined that Knight had, in

fact, failed to show that he possessed adequate qualifications for the

job."° Finally, although noting that the issue was not dispositive, the
court found that Knight's conviction for involvement in a drug deal "can
be construed as substantially related to the circumstances of a position
as a district agent. "'0 The Knight decision seemed to express a growing

willingness by Wisconsin courts, at least at the appellate level, to allow
employers reasonable deference in establishing certain policies against
the hiring of persons with criminal records. In sum, since County of
Milwaukee, cases have been resolved largely, but not exclusively, in the
favor of employers, showing that a liberal interpretation of the
substantial relationship exception lives on.'

104. Id.
105. Id. at 456 (finding that the WFEA-prior to the amendments codified in Wis.
STATS. §§ 111.337 and 111.34-did not impose upon employers a duty to accommodate an
employee's religious practices). Accordingly, "no accommodation is required [under the
WFEA] absent express language to the contrary." Id. (citing Am. Motors v. Dep't of Indus.
& Human Relations, 305 N.W.2d 62,77 (Wis. 1981)).
106. Id. at 454. In addition to proving this factor,
to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination under WFEA, a
complainant must prove that: (1) he or she was a member of a protected class under
the statute, (2) he or she was discharged ... and (4) either he or she was replaced by
someone not within the protected class or that others not in the protected class were
treated more favorably.
Id. (citing Puetz Motor Sales, Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 376 N.W.2d 372, 37475 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985)).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 456 ("As a district agent, Knight would have a significant amount of
unsupervised time making calls and would also have a fiduciary responsibility to his
customers that would include handling sums of money.").
110. An assessment of the merit of the court's decision in County of Milwaukee, and its
continued application, will be undertaken infra Part III.B.
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v. Current Legal Limbo: The Saga of Michael Moore
Belief that the County of Milwaukee decision effectively gutted the
WFEA's ban on conviction record consideration in employment
decisions should be tempered by the legal conclusions in a recent, highprofile case involving this provision. The case involved an applicant for
a position as boiler attendant in a public elementary school in
Milwaukee. The applicant, Michael Moore, had been previously
convicted for "'injury by conduct regardless of life,'" at that time a Class
C felony, involving his accidental scalding of a child resulting from a
domestic dispute with his wife."' The LIRC concluded, inter alia, that
this crime did not fall within the substantial relation exception and that
the Milwaukee Board of School Directors (MBSD) had unlawfully
discriminated against Moore on the basis of his criminal record by
failing to hire him." The MBSD appealed this decision to Milwaukee
County Circuit Court, which subsequently affirmed the LIRC
decision."
The MBSD subsequently filed an appeal to the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals, which ruled in favor of the LIRC's finding that Moore was
unlawfully discriminated against by the MBSD because of his conviction
record."' The court reached this conclusion by first finding that the
LIRC's initial decision was entitled to a great weight of deference under
the court's standard of review."5 Although summarily addressing some
of the primary conclusions and reasoning of County of Milwaukee, the
court ultimately concluded that the LIRC "properly applied the
statutory exception and correctly concluded that the circumstances of
Moore's conviction were not substantially related to the job of Boiler

111. Moore v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., ERD Case No. 199604335 (LIRC July 23,
1999).
112. Id.
113. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, Case No. 99-CV006637 (Milwaukee County Circuit Court June 14, 2000), available at http://www.dwd.state.
wi.us/lirc/moorcrct.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2002).
114. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, No. 00-1956,2001
Wisc. App. LEXIS 601, at *25 (Wis. Ct. App. June 12,2001) (unpublished, limited precedent
decision under Wis. STAT. § 809.23(3) (1999-2000)). The vote of the court of appeals panel
was 2-1. The court of appeals reviewed the LIRC decision and not the circuit court's
decision. Id. at *6 (citing Stafford Trucking, Inc. v. Dep't of Indust. Labor & Human
Relations, 306 N.W.2d 79 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981)).
115. Id. at *7-12 (citing CBS, Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 579 N.W.2d 668

(Wis. 1998)).
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Attendant Trainee."116 The court also disagreed with the view that the
LIRC's decision "imposes a new legal standard on employers by
requiring them to demonstrate a substantialprobability that a potential
employee with a prior conviction would once again engage in criminal
conduct."1 7 Finally, the court dismissed the MBSD's contention that the
character traits revealed by Moore's conviction are likely to reappear on
his job, and the court further said that Moore's "sporadic contact with
children" is not enough to suggest further criminal conduct will be
fostered on his part.1 The MBSD subsequently submitted a petition for
review to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which was denied early in the
court's 2001-2002 term.119
c. ProposedDeletion of Conviction Records as an ImpermissibleBasis
for Employment DiscriminationUnderthe WFEA
In the 1999-2000 session of the Wisconsin State Legislature, both
chambers drafted bills that would have stricken conviction records as
one of the bases protected from discrimination under the WFEA.1 " The
Assembly version would have permitted discrimination against any
individual who had been convicted of a felony,1 21 while the Senate
version would have also eliminated the WFEA protection for those
convicted of misdemeanors or "other offense[s]."1 " Although the
Assembly version of the bill passed by a wide margin, the Senate bill
never reached a vote and thus died at the end of the legislative session.
The impetus for the bills proposed in the 1999-2000 session was
largely the public outcry generated by two high-profile applications of
the law in favor of the employment rights of a previously convicted job
applicant.'3 It is uncertain whether either bill or similar proposed
116. Id. at *17.
117. Id. at n.3.
118. Id. at *20. Interestingly, the court also stated that "had the legislature wished to
create such a blanket exception pertaining to schools, it would have done so." Id. at *21-22.
119. 635 N.W.2d 783 (Wis. 2001).
120. Assemb. B. 469, 95th Legis. Sess. (Wis. 1999); S.B. 238, 95th Legis. Sess. (Wis.
1999).
121. The Assembly also passed a bill that would have specifically exempted "educational
agencies," including schools from the WFEA conviction record law. Assemb. B. 446, 95th
Legis. Sess. (Wis. 1999).
122. Assemb. B. 469, 95th Legis. Sess. (Wis. 1999); S.B. 238, 95th Legis. Sess. (Wis.
1999).
123. The first instance involved the case of Michael Moore, discussed supra notes 111119 and accompanying text. The second instance involved Gerald Turner, a man known in
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changes to the WFEA will be raised again in future legislative
sessions-although, given the legal disposition obtained in the Moore
case, some legislators have expressed a renewed interest to amend the
conviction record provision." It is difficult to disentangle the political
circumstances surrounding the creation, continuation, or possible
deletion of criminal records as a protected basis from employment

discrimination from the legal issues involved. Moreover, the WFEA
criminal record provision, and the principles underlying the law,
generate considerable emotion by both its advocates and detractors.
Nevertheless, legal practitioners and analysts must fully understand
what effect a decision to delete conviction records would have on the
law and on employers and employees in Wisconsin.
B. Treatment of Conviction Record Discriminationin Other States

Wisconsin remains one of only a handful of states with employment
discrimination laws addressing arrest or conviction records. A survey of
the statutory treatment by other states with respect to discrimination on

the basis of conviction records, and the corresponding application of
these statutes by the courts, allows for comparison with Wisconsin."
The Illinois Human Rights Act, for example, which serves as the
state's fair employment practice law, prohibits employment
discrimination based on certain criminal history records and related
information." While its statutory restriction on the use of criminal
Wisconsin as "the Halloween Killer." Turner had been convicted of child sexual assault and
second-degree murder of a nine-year-old girl trick-or-treating on Halloween 1973. See
Thomas Hruz, Criminals Escaping Affliction: Gerald Turner and Wisconsin's Fair
Employment Law, WI: WISCONSIN INTEREST, Winter 2000, at 7. After his release from
prison and involuntary civil confinement under Wisconsin's sexual predator law, Turner
applied for a job with Waste Management, Inc., involving the sorting of recyclables. Id. at 9.
After Waste Management, Inc. refused to hire Turner, he filed a complaint under the WFEA.
Id. After an administrative law judge found probable cause that unlawful discrimination
based on conviction records had occurred, Waste Management, Inc. settled out of court with
Turner for an undisclosed amount of money. Id. Therefore, the case never formally reached
the LIRC for review. The legal issues involved with these decisions, especially the Moore
case, are discussed in greater detail infra Part III.
124. Toni Kertscher, MPS Must Rehire Felon, Give Him $150,000 in Back Pay,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 4,2001, at B1.
125. Part HII, infra, of this Comment addresses these issues, along with providing
extensive normative judgments as to why such a change in the law better recognizes the
nature of how criminal records relate to employment and is therefore recommended.
126. A brief comparison to Wisconsin's current law and the treatment in other states
occurs later in this Comment infra Part III.C.
127. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-103 (West 1999).
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records is relatively limited, Illinois courts have found occasion to
directly address the issue of whether an employer may bar an applicant
from consideration for employment solely because of a criminal
conviction.'
In a case involving a racial minority applicant for a
university police position, the Illinois Appellate Court found that no
grounds of business necessity justified the denial of employment due to
a single misdemeanor weapons possession charge."' The court based its
decision largely on the existing mitigating circumstances, such as the fact
that the conviction was five years prior to the denial to hire, that the
applicant had since developed a history of quality and responsible
police-related work, and, finally, that the employer had presented no
evidence exhibiting how the applicant's conviction was reasonably
related to his current ability to perform the job successfully. 3" From this
language and logic, and given the seeming congruence between the
elements of the criminal offense (weapons violation) and the job applied
for (police officer), Illinois courts have pursued a rule more akin to the
factors-specific test previously applied in Wisconsin.
Hawaii state law, meanwhile, makes it an unlawful employment
practice to discriminate on the basis of an "arrest and court record."'
The law allows employers to inquire as to an applicant's criminal
conviction record from the past ten years, provided that the crime in the
record "bears a rational relationship to the duties and responsibilities of
the position.', 3 2 Furthermore, this inquiry may take place "only after
the prospective employee has received a conditional offer of
employment which may be withdrawn if the prospective employee has a
conviction record that bears a rational relationship to the duties and
responsibilities of the position.""3 Hawaii also provides an exception
similar to that found under Wisconsin law, which allows employers to
consider conviction records that are substantially related to the job
sought."4 Overall, Hawaii's law closely resembles Wisconsin's law.
128. Bd. of Trs. v. Knight, 516 N.E.2d 991 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1987).
129. Id. at 999.
130. Id. at 997-98
131. HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 378-2 (Michie 1999).
132. Id. § 378-2.5.
133. Id.
134. Id. § 378-3 ("Nothing in this part shall be deemed to ...[p]rohibit or prevent the
establishment and maintenance of bona fide occupational qualifications reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of a particular business or enterprise, and that have a substantial
relationship to the functions and responsibilities of prospective or continued employment.").
For more information on Hawaii's law regarding discrimination on the basis of criminal
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Pennsylvania also requires that an employer's consideration of an
individual's felony or misdemeanor conviction record when deciding
whether to hire that individual can be done "only to the extent to which
[the convictions] relate to the applicant's suitability for employment in
the position for which he has applied."1 5 Pennsylvania state courts have,
in the past, interpreted this provision so as to give it great force. 6
Likewise, the state constitution has been interpreted to bar public
employers from denying employment based on conviction records."
Finally, since 1977, the State of New York has restricted employers'
use of criminal conviction records to deny employment to applicants
"unless: (1) there is a direct relationship between one or more of the
previous criminal offenses and the... employment sought; or (2) ... the

granting of the employment would involve an unreasonable risk to
property or to the safety or welfare of specific individuals or the general
public." ' Unlike in other states, this New York law specifically sets
forth the factors to be considered in determining the relationship
between the job and the criminal offensesUI These factors include
specific inquiries into how the job relates to the crime, the time that has
elapsed since the criminal offense, the age of the person at the time of
the criminal offense, the seriousness of the offense, legitimate interests
in protecting property and the public, business safety, and evidence of
rehabilitation provided by the applicant."f
records, see Sheri-Ann S.L. Lau, Recent Development, Employment DiscriminationBecause
of One's Arrestand CourtRecord in Hawaii,22 U. HAW. L. REV. 709 (2000).
135. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9125 (West 1999).
136. Hunter v. Port Auth., 419 A.2d 631, 634 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) ("[Pennsylvania's]
Supreme Court has not hesitated to limit unwarranted governmental restrictions upon an
individual's right to engage in lawful employment on account of the individual's past criminal
record.") (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9125).
137. Id. at 635. The Pennsylvania Superior Court stated that it has:
no trouble concluding that when a person is denied public employment on the basis
of a prior conviction for which he has been pardoned, unless the conviction is
reasonably related to the person's fitness to perform the job sought, or to some
other legitimate governmental objective, [the Pennsylvania State Constitution] is
violated.

Id.
138. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 752 (McKinney 1998); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney
1998). These statutes have only been held applicable to those seeking employment and not
current employees. See Green v. Wells Fargo Alarm Serv., 596 N.Y.S.2d 412,413 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1993).
139. N.Y. CORRECr. LAW § 753.
140. Id.
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No other states have directly addressed within their laws the matter

of employment discrimination based on criminal conviction records for
all employers. Courts in other states that address discrimination
complaints based on conviction record consideration mostly defer to the
treatment available under Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act',
and either explicitly or implicitly adopt the disparate impact test
developed under federal law.'42 Still, other states have attempted to

address this issue in a less formal and less thorough fashion. For
example, the State of Washington's Human Rights Commission issued a
regulation barring bias against persons convicted of crimes, only to have
the state appellate court rule that the Commission exceeded its

authority in so doing.'43 A number of states, such as California and
Massachusetts, do not bar employers from using criminal records in
employment considerations, but they do restrict employers from
requesting that information from employees or potential employees.'"
A few states disallow the consideration of conviction records in state
licensing decisions for certain types of employment'45 or for civil service
positions.46 Finally, some state courts have expressly declined to hold

141. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to e-17 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
142. See, e.g., Heatherington v. State Pers. Bd., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1182
(Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (finding that the employer successfully demonstrated that the prior
criminal conduct bore a significant relationship to the duties of a police officer). "More
frequently [than specific state statutes prohibiting discrimination based on criminal offenses],
challenges to employment discrimination on the basis of prior conviction or arrest are based
on constitutional grounds or are alleged to violate Title VII." 1 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 14,
§ 1.9. For a description of the federal law on employment discrimination involving criminal
records, see infra Part II.C.
143. Gugin v. Sonico, Inc., 846 P.2d 571 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
144. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 13326 (West 1998); Bynes v. Sch. Comm., 581 N.E.2d
1019, 1020 (Mass. 1991) (applying MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 151B, § 4(9) (1990)); see also D.C.
CODE ANN. § 2-1402.66 (2000) (limiting inquiry into conviction records to those crimes
having been committed in the past ten years). For a complete discussion of how states apply
various restrictions on when and how employers can access an applicant's criminal records,
see 1 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 14, § 1.9.
145. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:2950 (West 2000) (stating that "a person shall
not [be unable] to engage in any trade, occupation, or profession for which a license, permit
or certificate is required to be issued by the state of Louisiana... solely because of a prior
criminal record," except when an applicant has been convicted of a felony that directly relates
to the job or trade sought).
146. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-80(a)-(d) (West 1998) (restricting state
employers from the ability to disqualify any person from employment solely on the basis of a
criminal conviction unless the nature of the crime and its relationship to the job in question,
the convicted person's rehabilitation, and the time elapsed since the conviction or release
show that the employee is unfit for the position); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 364.03 (West 1999)
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that persons with conviction records are a class deserving of fair

employment protection."
C. The FederalApproach to Considerationsof Conviction Records

Unlike Wisconsin law, federal statutory law does not expressly
restrict the ability of employers to consider criminal conviction records
within employment-related decisions. Instead, federal law concerns
itself with considerations of criminal convictions indirectly, largely by
the application of the theory of disparate impact through the Federal
Civil Rights Act of 1964."' This has occurred through various federal

court cases and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
decisions generating legal prohibitions against the use of arrest and
conviction records in employment decisions if such a policy has a
disparate impact on minorities and is not justified by a business
necessity."9 In general, the business necessity exception is the analog to
(stating that individuals shall not be disqualified from public employment because of a prior
criminal conviction, "unless the crime or crimes for which convicted directly relate to the
position of employment sought," and sufficient evidence of rehabilitation is not provided).
147. See, e.g., Leonard v. Corr. Cabinet, 828 S.W.2d 668, 672 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992)
("Although, if given the opportunity, Leonard might be able to prove that the Cabinet has
denied employment or promotions to more black applicants than white applicants because of
the felon status, we know of no established protected class involving persons with felony
records, and we decline to create one.").
148. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to e-17 (1994 & Supp. 2000). Some federal courts have
recognized federal constitutional violations in certain types of government-mandated
employment restrictions on the basis of criminal records. See Kindem v. City of Alameda,
502 F. Supp. 1108 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (finding that city's policy prohibiting municipal
employment of ex-felons violated a liberty interest and the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution); Thompson v. Gallagher, 489 F.2d
443 (5th Cir. 1973) (finding that a municipal ordinance barring employment as a custodian by
a person who had been discharged from the army under less than honorable circumstances
violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Smith v. Fussenich, 440 F. Supp. 1077 (D. Conn. 1977) (holding that a statute barring felony
offenders from employment by licensed detective and security guard agencies violates the
Equal Protection Clause); Osterman v. Paulk, 387 F. Supp. 669 (S.D. Fla. 1974) (finding that a
prohibition of employing, as city office clerks, persons who had used marijuana within past six
months was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause); Butts v. Nichols, 381 F. Supp. 573
(S.D. Iowa 1974) (holding that a statute absolutely prohibiting the employment of convicted
felons in civil service positions violates the Equal Protection Clause).
149. See, e.g., EEOC Dec. No. 74-89, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 431 (Oct. 18, 1971)
(stating EEOC position that an employer's policy or practice of excluding individuals from
employment on the basis of their conviction records has an adverse impact on blacks, given
statistics showing that these groups are convicted at a rate disproportionately greater than
their representation in the general population); EEOC Dec. No. 81-22, 27 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1811 (May 12, 1981) (same); EEOC Dec. No. 81-06, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
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Wisconsin's "substantial relation" exception.15 °

An understanding of the federal rule on criminal record
considerations is pertinent to the present analysis for two reasons. First,
the underlying rationale of the federal law, as reflected in its
enforcement, is starkly different than Wisconsin's approach. Wisconsin
prohibits discrimination against former criminals in most any manner,
while federal law only restricts this type of discrimination to the extent it
unintentionally causes discrimination against an otherwise suspect class,
namely racial minorities.
Second, were the State of Wisconsin to
eliminate its inclusion of conviction records as a prohibited basis for
discrimination, employees in the state would be left with federal law as
the means by which to seek redress for discrimination.'
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits certain
types of discrimination in employment, with its directives applying to
most employers.'53 Title VII explicitly prohibits discrimination on the

basis of race, color, religion, national origin, and sex, with the latter
category having been construed to include pregnancy, childbirth and
related conditions.'- 4 The Act makes it unlawful for employers to treat
persons within these classes differently in matters related to hiring,
termination, compensation, or other terms, conditions, or privileges of
(BNA) 1779 (Nov. 7, 1980) (same with regard to Hispanics); EEOC Dec. No. 80-10, 6 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1792 (Aug. 1, 1980) (same); see also Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 523
F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975); Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401,403 (C.D. Cal. 1970),
modified on othergrounds, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972).
150. A comparison between these two tests of legal validity (the substantial relation and
business necessity exceptions) is discussed infra Part III.B.2.
151. This difference will be discussed in great detail, infra Part II.D.
152. A discussion of how federal law on the subject would apply in the absence of the
Wisconsin ban on criminal record consideration is directly discussed infra Part III.D.
153. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to e-17. Employers must be involved in interstate commerce
and have at least fifteen employees for each working day in order to fall under the purview of
the Civil Rights Act. Id. § 2000e(b). Title VII also applies to federal government employees.
Id. § 2000e-16(a).
154. Specifically, Title VII includes language stating that
[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
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employment.f5 In this respect, the law is analogous to the Wisconsin

Fair Employment Act, as with similar laws in most other states. The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is given the
authority to interpret and enforce the provisions of Title VIIV6 and, as
with Wisconsin's LIRC, handles most claims based on Title VII without
such cases reaching the courts.'
Title VII's reach covers two general types of employment
discrimination. First, the law prohibits employers from discriminating
directly on the basis of an applicant's or employee's inclusion in one of
the protected, or "suspect," classes named in the law. 8 Actions or
policies that discriminate in this manner fall under the rubric of
"disparate treatment," and absent the showing of a well-founded, bona
fide occupational qualification for such discrimination, these practices
will almost invariably be found in violation of Title VII. 9 The
fundamental element of these claims is the showing of discriminatory
intent against the person harmed because of his inclusion in one of the
protected classes.f°
Title VII also prohibits ostensibly neutral job requirements, if those
criteria disproportionately exclude a protected class and they are not
job-related or necessitated by a feature of the job or business involved. 6
155. "[T]o limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
156. The EEOC's enforcement provisions are located in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5; its
regulations and guidelines are found in 29 C.F.R. § 1614 (2001).
157. In Fiscal Year 2000, the EEOC was involved, either through a direct suit or by way
of intervention, with 304 lawsuits involving Title VII claims. EEOC Litigation Statistics,FY
1992 through 2000, available at http:llwww.eeoc.gov/statsllitigation.html (last modified Jan.
31, 2001). By way of comparison, the total number of charge receipts filed under Title VII
with the EEOC in FY 2000 was 59,588. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Charges FY
1992-FY2000, availableat http://www.eeoc.gov/statslvii.html (last modified Jan. 18,2001).
158. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. -Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (setting out the
Court's view of disparate treatment cases under Title VII).
159. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,335 n.15 (1977).
160. See GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, MAJOR ISSUES IN THE FEDERAL LAW OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 10 (3d ed. 1996). Employers who are alleged to have
discriminated under Title VII by disparate treatment also have a defense of disavowing any
discriminatory intent or motive. Id. at 20.
161. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (holding that Title VII also
proscribes practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation). According to the
Court in Griggs, "Congress directed the thrust of the [Civil Rights Act of 1964] to the
consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation." Id. at 432. But see
RiCHARD
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Such occurrences invoke a "disparate impact" analysis by the courts or
the EEOC, which was first approved as a judicial analytical technique by
the United States Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Company."

Disparate impact jurisprudence has
central tenet of the theory has been
Generally, its application is premised
are fair in form, but discriminatory

had a colorful history and the
described in a variety of ways."
on the notion that "practices that
in operation" violate Title VII,

absent a business necessity for that practice.'9

Although disparate

impact claims may arise from the use of numerous types of subjectively
or objectively scored criteria, the focus of this Comment is on the use of
criminal conviction records. Generally, employers that refuse to hire
applicants on the basis of previous criminal convictions may, in effect,
disproportionately exclude minority applicants, and in many geographic
areas, this disparate effect may be more probable. 65 Unlike under a
disparate treatment claim, no discriminatory intent against a protected
class must be shown to advance a claim. 66
Under a Title VII disparate impact claim, the plaintiff carries the
burden of proving that the employment practice in question does in fact

disparately impact the class of which the individual is a member. 67 Once
a plaintiff evidences this type of disparate impact, an employer fighting

the claim has two options. First, the employer can attack the evidence

that minorities truly are affected negatively by the policy to a more
disproportionate degree than non-minorities.168 The employer's second
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 197-200 (1992) (arguing that imposing employment discrimination

liability in instances of statistically disparate impact was manifestly beyond the intent of the
drafters of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
162. 401 U.S. at 430. Griggs involved an employer's requirement of a high school
education or passing of a standardized general intelligence test as a condition of employment
in, or transfer to, higher-level jobs. Id. at 427-28. The Court held that this practice violated
Title VII because the requirements were not related to successful job performance, and
further that the employer's lack of discriminatory intent was not controlling because Title VII
required a look to the consequences of employment practices. Id. at 431-33. The facts also
showed that this company had a history of racial discrimination prior to the 1964 Civil Rights
Act and that the employer's intelligence tests were aimed at achieving this same type of racial
discrimination. Id. at 426.
163. See, e.g., MICHAEL EVAN GOLD, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 17 (1993) ("The basic idea of disparate impact is that an
employment practice should affect various classes of people in the same way ....
164. Griggs,401 U.S. at 431.
165. See sources cited supra note 149.
166. See RUTHERGLEN, supra note 160, at 17-18.
167. Griggs,401 U.S. at 429; see also GOLD, supra note 163, at 19.
168. This defense will likely be attempted by criticizing the plaintiff's statistical analysis,
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option is to prove that the exclusion of persons convicted of certain

offenses is job-related and consistent with a business necessity.'69
It is crucial to note that since a conviction record is not expressly
listed in the Federal Civil Rights Act as a prohibited basis for
discrimination, no disparate treatment claim can be brought on the basis
of being in the class of convicted criminals." Likewise, disparate impact
theory in the context of criminal records only arises if the policy is
applied equally to all applicants, yet would still have a statistically
greater adverse effect on minorities. Some employers may also attempt
to use an applicant's criminal record as a mere pretext for racial
discrimination. For example, an employer may use conviction records
as a reason to deny employment to black applicants, while concurrently
not rejecting similarly situated white applicants." In these instances,
the action is analyzed under a disparate treatment test, not a disparate
impact one,' and is better framed as an instance of direct racial
discrimination.'

including a narrowing of the applicable geographical region from which the statistical
comparison is made, or by proffering applicant flow data showing how different groups of
persons apply.
169. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. Courts have also recognized that this second defense
usually entails rebutting any claims by the plaintiff that the employer's legitimate business
concern could be addressed equally well by alternative means that would reduce the disparate
impact. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,425 (1975); Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321,329 (1977).
170. The relevance of this point will be highlighted when the Title VII analysis is
compared to the WFEA approach to criminal records, infra Part II,in that under Wisconsin
law, a disparate treatment claim is available to those discriminated against on the basis of
their conviction record.
171. See, e.g., McGaughy v. State Human Rights Comm'n, 612 N.E.2d 964 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993) (finding evidence that African-American employee's discharge was racially motivated
when a Caucasian co-worker convicted of a similar offense was not likewise terminated). But
cf.Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793, 802-03 (7th Cir. 1979) (claiming that the substitution
of discriminatory impact for discriminatory intent is premised on the existence of a pattern or
practice on the part of employer using arrest records and, that the school board, in refusing to
promote a black teacher because of his arrest, had not impermissibly discriminated under
Title VII).
172. See 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH), Conviction Records §604.10 2088 (1998).
173. Note that, similar to the WFEA, the EEOC has ruled that "discharge of or failure
to hire an employee who falsifies an inquiry concerning his conviction record on an
employment application is not a violation of Title VI..." EEOC Dec. No. 80-26, 26 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1810, 1811 n.4 (Sept. 11, 1980) ("[T]here are no data or testimony
showing that Blacks either lie more than other groups or that they are disproportionately
excluded from employment because of falsification of application forms.").
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2. Green v. MissouriPacific Railroad

The leading case in the federal courts concerning matters of
discrimination based on conviction records remains Green v. Missouri
Pacific Railroad Company.7
In Green, a three-judge panel of the
Eighth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals held that

employers subject to Title VII may not impose a policy barring all
persons with criminal convictions from employment, absent a showing
of business necessity for such policy.17

Missouri Pacific Railroad

followed an "absolute policy of refusing consideration for employment76

to any person convicted of a crime other than a minor traffic offense."0
Green, an African-American, applied for a job as a clerk with the

company, but
was denied employment solely on the basis of his prior
conviction."7
In deciding the case, the Eighth Circuit applied a similar analysis as
that which the federal courts had already applied to discrimination
7
based on arrest records."

First, the court looked to the statistical

evidence presented by the plaintiff showing that Missouri Pacific's
policy had a disproportionate and adverse impact on AfricanAmericans.'79 The court emphasized that Green had adequately shown
that blacks were convicted at a much higher rate in the St. Louis

174. 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).
175. Id. at 1298-99.
176. Id. at 1292.
177. Id. at 1292-93. Green had been convicted for refusing military induction during the
Vietnam War. Id. at 1292. Green had attempted to file as a conscientious objector on
religious grounds to avoid military service, but had been denied-and when he refused
induction, he was convicted. Id. at 1293 n.5.
178. See Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), affd and
vacated in part on other grounds, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972) (declaring unlawful an
employer's policy of disqualifying from employment consideration those applicants who had
been arrested on numerous occasions for offenses other than minor traffic offenses, after a
black plaintiff was denied a job due to the policy). The court held that even if such a policy is
applied objectively, it was discriminatory and unlawful because it had the foreseeable effect
of denying African-American applicants equal opportunities for employment. Id. at 403. The
court further found no business necessity for the policy. Id. at 402.
179. The court identified three ways of statistically establishing disproportionate impact.
The plaintiff may attempt to determine: (1) whether blacks as a class, or at least blacks in a
specified geographical area, are excluded by the suspect practice at a substantially higher rate
than whites; (2) the percentages of class member applicants that are actually excluded by the
practice or policy, or (3) the level of employment of blacks by the employer in comparison
with the percentage of blacks in the relevant labor market or geographic area. Green, 523
F.2d at 1293-94.
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metropolitan area than whites.t ° Moreover, upon examination of
Missouri Pacific's employment records, black applicants were two and
one-half times more likely to be rejected for employment from the
company than whites under this no-conviction policy.' As a result, the
court found that these statistics satisfied the plaintiff's prima facie case
of disparate impact.' The court then proceeded to assess the relative
merit of the defendant's claims of business necessity.1 3 In dismissing the
company's defenses, it concluded that although some consideration of
criminal records may be undertaken by employers, "[w]e cannot
conceive of any business necessity that would automatically place every
individual convicted of any offense, except a minor traffic offense, in the
permanent ranks of the unemployed."'s'
While Green held that use of conviction records as an absolute bar to
employment is unlawful, it did not entirely preclude the use of a
criminal conviction as an employment factor. Employers could still
weigh various factors, including conviction records for crimes related to
the job being applied for, to see if the offenses apply to that individual's
fitness for a job."' In fact, after Green had been remanded, it was
appealed back to the Eighth Circuit,"' which then elucidated its previous
opinion using language a bit more sympathetic to employers. Here, the
court denied a motion by Green to enjoin Missouri Pacific from using
conviction information as even a partial basis in disqualifying an
8
While repeating that absolute bars to
applicant for employment."
employment based on criminal records are impermissible, the court
affirmed the lower court's ruling that employers may still consider
an applicants' prior criminal record as a factor in making
180. Id. at 1294-95.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1295.
183. Missouri Pacific argued that at least seven reasons supported its no-conviction
policy, including: "(1) fear of cargo theft, (2) handling of company funds, (3) bonding
qualifications, (4) possible impeachment of employee as a witness, (5) possible liability for
hiring persons with known violent tendencies, (6) employment disruption caused by
recidivism, and (7) alleged lack of moral character of persons with convictions." Id. at 1298.
184. Id.
185. Id. ("Although the reasons MoPac advances for its absolute bar can serve as
relevant considerations in making individual hiring decisions, they in no way justify an
absolute policy which sweeps so broadly.").
186. Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 549 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1977).
187. Id. at 1160.
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individual hiring decisions so long as the [employer] takes into
account the nature and gravity of the offense or offenses, the

time that has passed since the conviction and/or completion of
sentence, and the nature of the job for which the applicant has
applied.""
The court seemed to stress that conviction records need not be

entirely ignored by employers, but rather that employers must use this
information only for a readily identifiable, purposeful, and defensible
reason. In essence, businesses were forewarned that if they are to

consider criminal convictions in making employment decisions, they
should do so with "kid gloves."
Some other federal courts have addressed the matter of employment

discrimination based on criminal conviction records, either building
upon Green or simply applying an independent analysis. These cases
show that, first, certain professions, most notably law enforcement,
firefighting, and other security-sensitive jobs, receive greater deference
to draft policies denying employment based on criminal records.189
Second, as in Wisconsin, while inquiries concerning an applicant's
conviction record are allowed, they must specify that answers will not
bar employment."9 Third, federal district courts remain able to invoke
188. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting from the trial court's injunctive order). The court
also referenced back to language it used in its earlier decision, which had stated "[a]lthough
the reasons [Missouri Pacific] advances for its absolute bar can serve as relevant
considerations in making individual hiring decisions, they in no way justify an absolute policy
which sweeps so broadly." Id. at 1160 n.1 (quoting Green, 523 F.2d at 1298).
189. See, e.g., Davis v. City of Dallas, 777 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 476 U.S.
1116 (1986) (upholding the requirement that applicants for police officer positions can not
have been convicted of more than three moving traffic violations in the preceding twelve
months, mentioning the public interest in the safe operation of squad cars and the reliability
of moving violations as a predictor of involvement in future accidents); Carter v. Gallagher,
452 F.2d 315, 326 (8th Cir. 1971) (allowing a fire department to give "fair consideration" to
recent convictions in evaluating an applicant's fitness for being a firefighter); United States v.
City of Chicago, 411 F. Supp. 218 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (holding that a prior conviction for a serious
crime may be a lawful reason to disqualify individuals from police work despite the
disproportional impact such a policy may have on minorities), affd in part, rev'd in part on
other grounds, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977); Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of Am., 332 F. Supp.
519 (E.D. La. 1971), affd per curiam, 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972) (allowing discrimination on
the basis of conviction record for a job as hotel bellman, given that the job requires the
handling of other individuals' property).
190. Although the EEOC maintains that employers may not terminate or refuse to hire
persons who give false or incomplete information regarding their conviction record, court
decisions overwhelmingly permit such actions in the absence of proof of disparate impact.
See BARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
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their discretion, recognized in Green,'9' to define the relevant class as
they see fit, including restricting the statistical analysis of disparate
impact to certain geographic areas or persons with certain
Fourth, federal courts have also looked to the
qualifications. 19
relationship between the criminal record and the job sought,93 while
some have also weighed the effect of the length of a hiring ban based on

a criminal offense."

Finally, courts since Green "have been quick to

distinguish cases in which conviction records are used only as one factor

in considering the application and cases in which the employer requires
a special level of trust in its employees."'95
Since disparate impact deals with seemingly less nefarious motives

and actions on the part of employers, the law has, in a sense, cut
employers some "legal slack." Yet disparate impact theory still strongly
favors the protection of suspect classes, even when only seemingly
neutral job requirements, like a conviction record ban, cause
discrimination.

6

3. The Business Necessity Exception
The force of Title VII's ban against the use of criminal conviction
records is tempered by whether any such policy is justified by a business
LAW 184 (2d ed. 1983).
191. Green, 523 F.2d at 1299 (stating that "the district court is vested with some
discretion in determining the parameters of the class" (citations omitted)).
192. It appears that there are "no cases wherein the third method was exclusively relied
upon to demonstrate the discriminatory impact of considering arrest or conviction records."
Annotation, Considerationof Arrest Record as Unlawful Employment Practice Violative of
Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 33 A.L.R. FED. 263, 271 n.9 (1977 & Supp. 2000).
Nonetheless, a few courts have, while not expressly invoking this type of analysis, acted in
accordance with such an approach. See, e.g., Hill v. United States Postal Serv., 522 F. Supp.
1283, 1302 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting statistical comparisons to the general population are less
probative when jobs require special qualifications).
193. Avant v. S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 716 F.2d 1083, 1087 (5th Cir. 1983); Despears v.
Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that employer legally demoted
employee to a job not requiring driving when employee lost driver's license after fourth
conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol, stating that the Americans with
Disabilities Act does not require overlooking infractions of the law).
194. Schanuel v. Anderson, 708 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1983) (upholding a state law imposing
a ten-year ban on the time between the end of a criminal sentence and employment as a
detective agent).
195. LEX LARSEN, EMPLOYMENT SCREENING § 9.05, at 9-14 to 9-15 (1996) (footnote
omitted).
196. See GOLD, supra note 163, at 17 ('[1f [an employment] practice has a
proportionately greater adverse effect on one class than on another, a good reason should
justify this effect.').
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Of course, "business necessity" can mean a myriad of

different things to many different people.1" The United States Supreme
Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Company, the progenitor of all disparate

impact cases, defined the term in a variety of ways, from a "reasonable"
practice that has a "demonstrabl[e] ...measure of job performance"' 98

to stating that "any given requirement must have a manifest relationship
to the employment in question."1" Some commentators have argued
that Griggs, despite the language found in the opinion, requires only

reasonable necessity, not absolute necessity.w In Green, the Eighth
Circuit applied a strict business necessity test, such that the contested
policy must not only foster safety and efficiency, but must also be
essential to that goal.f' Other courts have described business necessity
as when job performance can merely be demonstrably related to a noconviction requirement.m Finally, the EEOC has stated that "[t]o
establish business necessity, the employer must demonstrate that the
nature of a particular criminal conviction disqualifies the individual job
applicant from performing the particular job in an acceptable, businesslike manner."2°3
A thorough inspection of business necessity jurisprudence, including
arguments over the competing definitions of the concept and its effect
on disparate impact claims of discrimination, is outside the scope of this
Comment.
A few summary comments, however, are helpful in
197. See, e.g., Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. Cal. 1970)
("'[B]usiness necessity' means that the practice or policy is essential to the safe and efficient
operation of the business."); 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH), Policy Guidance on the
Considerationof Arrest § 604.10 2094 (1998) ("Business necessity can be established where
the employee or applicant is engaged in conduct which is particularly egregious or related to
the position in question.").
198. 401 U.S. 424,436 (1971).
199. Id. at 432.
200. See Marcus B. Chandler, Comment, The Business Necessity Defense to DisparateImpact Liability Under Title VII, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 911,933 (1979).
201. Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290, 1297-98 (8th Cir. 1975) (stating that
business necessity "connotes an irresistible demand") (quoting United States v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry. Co., 464 F.2d 301,308 (8th Cir. 1972)).
202, See, e.g., Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of Am., 332 F. Supp. 519,521 (E.D. La. 1971).
203. EEOC Dec. No. 81-7,27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1780 (Nov. 12,1980).
204. For a review of the various interpretations given to "business necessity," see
generally James 0. Pearson, Annotation, What Constitutes "Business Necessity" Justifying
Employment PracticePrimaFacie DiscriminationUnder Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964,
36 A.L.R. Fed. 9 (1978); Linda Lye, Comment, Title VII's Tangled Tale: The Erosion and
Confusion of DisparateImpact and The Business Necessity Defense, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 315 (1998).
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comparing the federal exception with Wisconsin's substantial relation
exception and in analyzing the general merit of restricting
discrimination based on criminal conviction records.
Two basic and quasi-independent elements to business necessity
emerge from these various formulations of the concept. First, it seems
evident that the business necessity exemption is closely related to fears
of criminal recidivism on the job and, more specifically, to concerns of
negligent hiring by employers.'
Second, and perhaps more central to
disparate impact jurisprudence, the business necessity test focuses on
how well previously committed criminal offenses indicate an applicant's
unfitness or inability to perform a job well. The EEOC has articulated

this rationale perhaps the most frequently.2

According to the EEOC,

an employer claiming a business necessity for a no-conviction policy
must show only that it considered three factors: "(1) The nature and
gravity of the offense or offenses; (2) The time that has passed since the
conviction and/or completion of the sentence; and (3) The nature of the
job held or sought."2w This language now reflects that used by the

205. According to two commentators, "where the job involves a demonstrable economic
or human risk, relatively little evidence may be required to establish the business justification
for excluding those with convictions for job-related serious crimes. A greater degree of job
relatedness is required with respect to jobs with a low degree of economic or human risk."
BARBARA LINEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, I EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 189-90
(Paul W. Crane, Jr. et al. eds., 3d ed. 1976) (footnote omitted). While this statement does
refer to economic factors, clearly there is an interrelationship between the crime or crimes on
the record and the nature of the job. This connection is discussed in greater detail infra Part
III.A.3.
206. See Lye, supra note 204, at 339 (stating that the EEOC conviction record decisions
after Green gave particular emphasis to the job-connectedness of the conviction).
207. 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH), Conviction Records §604.10 2088 (1998). Shortly
after Green, the EEOC established guidelines for its policy enforcement of Title VII claims
alleging impermissible discrimination on the basis of criminal convictions, which included
guidelines for employers wishing to establish a business necessity defense based on the
exclusion from employment individuals with a conviction record. Id. Initially, the EEOC
standards required an employer to show, first, that the criminal offense was job-related and,
second, that the employer "had... examine[d] other relevant factors to determine whether
the conviction affected the individual's ability to perform the job in a manner consistent with
the safe and efficient operation of the employer's business." Id. at n.4 (citing EEOC Dec. No.
78-35, 6720 (CCH 1983)). The EEOC specifically outlined what factors should be included
for the employer to consider. These include: "(1) The number of offenses and the
circumstances of each offense for which the, individual was convicted; (2) The length of time
intervening between the conviction for the offense and the employment decision; (3) The
individual's employment history; and (4) The individual's efforts at rehabilitation." Id.
(citing EEOC Dec. No. 78-35, 6720 (CCH 1983)). In 1985, the EEOC modified this
guideline, eliminating the two-step process in favor of a simpler one-step approach. Id.
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Eighth Circuit in its decision following the Green remand and
essentially eliminates the need for employers to consider the applicant's
total employment history and efforts at rehabilitation.'
Yet some federal courts have been less than faithful in adhering to
the EEOC's interpretation of business necessity. For example, one
federal district court essentially dismissed the factor of time that has
passed since the conviction, when it upheld a trucking company's
lifetime bar of employment to drivers who have been convicted of theft
crimes, arguing that the EEOC failed to produce evidence that a shorter
ban would be equally effective."' This court instead established a
relatively weak business necessity test, stating that a defendant
attempting to justify its no-conviction policy need only show that the
policy "'serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of
the employer.' 2, 1 This language came directly from the 1989 United
States Supreme Court decision in Wards Cove v. Antonio, which
attempted to establish a significant change in the understanding of
business necessity, even going so far as to alter the phrase to "business
justification," a much more permissive-sounding connotation.212
It was the decision in Wards Cove that largely prompted Congress to
pass the Civil Rights Act of 1991,213 which strengthened and returned the
business necessity defense to the nature it assumed before Wards Cove.
As it stands now, an employment policy challenged under disparate
impact must be shown by the employer to be "job-related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity." 121 Overall,
as with Wisconsin's substantial relations test, the meaning of the
business necessity defense remains deeply confused, with opposing
viewpoints as to whether the defense should be narrowly drawn
(favoring ex-convicts' employment opportunities) or broadly read
(favoring employers' interests)."
208. See supra Part II.C.2.
209. 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH), Conviction Records § 604.10 2088 (1998).
210. Equal Empl. Opportunity Comm'n v. Carolina Freight Carriers, 723 F. Supp. 734,
753 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
211. Id. at 752 (quoting Wards Cove Packaging Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659
(1989)).
212. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 658 (1989).
213. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
214. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1994).
215. See Lye, supra note 204, at 361 (recognizing how clarification of the federal business
necessity test, as applied in the context of discrimination on the basis of conviction records,
will prioritize these competing interests).
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III. ANALYSIS: THE BENEFIT OF LIVING IN A WORLD WITHOUT THE
WISCONSIN FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT'S PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF
CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS

A greater allowance of conviction record considerations on the part
of employers should be permitted and a greater sensitivity is needed
regarding the questionable principles supporting the inclusion of former
criminals among the classes deserving legal protection from employment
The subject of discrimination based on criminal
discrimination.
convictions generates a full range of emotions: from those who proclaim
that a beneficial social policy is found in the offering of equal
employment opportunities to those in need of rehabilitation and
reintegration into normal society, to those who find the commission of
criminal activity to be, at least to some degree, an exhibition of a
behavior relevant to employment qualifications. The remainder of this
Comment focuses on the differences between the effect of a law
constructed in such a manner as the WFEA's criminal record bar versus
the Title VII, disparate impact legal treatment of discrimination based
on conviction records.
A. Critiquingthe Rationale Behind Criminal Conviction Record
Employment Protection
The following four sections inspect the issue of employment
discrimination based on conviction records through the lens of four
partially overlapping perspectives. The first section critiques the basic
notion of conferring to persons with criminal records a distinct and
independent status worthy of protection from employment
discrimination. The second section briefly inspects the practical matter
of how criminal convictions reflect on character traits that seemingly
weigh on any employer's hiring decisions. The third section addresses a
related issue of how all criminal records are not created equal, and
employers may reasonably desire to discriminate against certain crimes
and not others, even when the crime causing the prejudice is not directly
related to the job duties of an employee. Finally, this analysis touches
upon the intriguing matter of how a fair employment law barring
consideration of criminal records frustrates the ability of employers to
shield themselves from tort liability under a theory of negligent hiring.
In analyzing each of these perspectives, the analysis highlights the
material differences, if any, between the legal treatment found under
Wisconsin law versus under federal law.
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1. Immutable Characteristics Versus Immoral Characteristics: Squaring
Disparate Impact, Subject-Class Analysis, and the Status of Being a
Convicted Criminal
a. Persons with Conviction Records as a Protected Class?

The primary fault with the WFEA's ban against discrimination
based on criminal convictions lies in the resulting equation of this
provision with other groups of individuals protected from employment
discrimination. It is only by explicitly listing discrimination based on
conviction records as unlawful that Wisconsin, or any other state, can
provide ex-convicts with the same equal employment protection as
racial minorities and women, and make ex-convicts a suspect class.16
The WFEA, in so doing, has taken the spirit of readily justifiable civil
rights laws and distorted their meaning so as to protect a class unworthy
of being rewarded with such extra protection.
Although the intention of the law is largely based on social policy
considerations of criminal rehabilitation, it remains exceedingly difficult
to justify why this highly mutable trait, one terribly reflective of an
individual's character, is essentially restricted for employers to consider,
while the multitude of other character-relevant traits avoid legal
scrutiny. 21 Regardless of whether other classes of people commonly
granted employment protection under federal and state fair
employment laws are also deserving, it seems apparent that former
criminals, particularly those having committed violent offenses, are the
least sympathetic population to receive such legal protection. Deep
within the jurisprudence of employment law and equal protection law is
a recognition between mutable traits, which are reflective of volitional
actions of individuals, and immutable traits, which an individual
acquires through birth and are usually benign.218 Furthermore, there
216. See Bruce E. May, Real World Reflections: The Character Component of
Occupational Licensing Laws: A Continuing Barrier to the Ex-Felon's Employment
Opportunities, 71 N.D. L. REv. 187, 204 (1995) (noting that "convicted felons are not
considered a suspect class unless a state statute specifically provides for protection").
217. This assertion, of course, can be read to imply two, very different inferences: first,
that even more (if not all) forms of character traits should be disallowed consideration under
employment discrimination laws, especially when these traits are not readily related to the
functional aspects of an individual's job; or second, that no legal restriction should be
imposed on employers to consider any character elements of an individual, when character is
defined through a mutable trait acquired by volitional activity on the part of the individual.
218. See, e.g., Univ. of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (finding that racial
preferences in admissions to a state medical college could be used to further compelling state

2002]

CONVICTION RECORD DISCRIMINATION

should be a recognized difference under the law between benign

mutable traits, such as adherence to a creed, and rationally
objectionable mutable traits, such as criminal behavior.
Because of these concerns, early cases applying disparate impact
analysis implicitly understood that the underlying reason for a plaintiff's
class being adversely affected by job criteria was of something beyond
their control (i.e., historical discrimination, inferior schooling, et
cetera.).219 It was not until Green that the courts found it wise to expand

disparate impact analysis to matters under an individual's control,
namely the commission of crime. m Despite this expansion in the

legitimacy of disparate impact analysis, persons claiming discrimination
on the basis of criminal records rarely have a disparate treatment claim
under federal law-precisely because individuals with criminal records

are not specifically listed as a suspect class in need of protection under
federal law. This construction is in contradistinction to Wisconsin law,
where persons with criminal records are accorded independent
protection.
In contrast to the WFEA, the protection accorded under Title VII to
individuals previously convicted of crimes does an admirable, if not
completely satisfactory, job of balancing the interests of racial
minorities, who may be pretextually discriminated against by the use of
criminal records, with the desire to refrain from passing along to former
interests in educational diversity). In the opinion of four of the Justices (Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun):
[R]ace, like gender and illegitimacy... is an immutable characteristic which its
possessors are.powerless to escape or set aside. While a classification is not per se
invalid because it divides classes on the basis of an immutable characteristic..., it is
nevertheless true that such divisions are contrary to our deep belief that "legal
burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or
wrongdoing," ... and that advancement sanctioned, sponsored, or approved by the
State should ideally be based on individual merit or achievement, or at the least on
factors within the control of an individual.
Id. at 360-61 (citations omitted) (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). This distinction is made to highlight the inherent natural and
legal differences between criminal records and other, traditionally suspect classifications
under the law. Although states are free to restrict employment discrimination based on
nearly any discrete characteristic, there appears to be a hierarchy of traits that define the
various prohibited bases of discrimination.
219. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971) (discussing how
the historically inferior educational opportunities afforded to blacks allowed disparate impact
analysis against employment tests that could not be justified as a business necessity).
220. See Lye, supra note 204, at 336-37.
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criminals the distinction of a being a specifically protected class. This
approach under federal law maintains a significant emphasis that the
primary problem with employment discrimination based on conviction
records is that such a policy may have a disparate, negative effect on
minorities, who are, appropriately, an independently suspect and
protected class under discrimination law. Although it is clear that such a
policy basis underlies Wisconsin's inclusion of conviction records as a
prohibited basis for discrimination,' there is a stark and important
difference found in listing criminals as an independently protected class
versus protecting another class, namely racial minorities, who may be
functionally harmed by certain applications of no-conviction
employment policies.
In legal terms, the nature of this debate is whether a disparate
treatment or a disparate impact analysis should apply to use of
conviction records in employment decisions.
Under the former
approach, every instance in which an employer uses the fact of an
employee's or applicant's criminal past as a basis for its decision will
generate a valid discrimination claim, assuming a lack of business
necessity or a substantial relation between the job and the crime.'
Under the latter approach, an employer's use of criminal histories will
be permitted absent a showing that such a policy disproportionately
affects another specific group granted protection from employment
discrimination.
There is good reason to be cautious about applying the same analysis
to discrimination based on conviction record versus other
characteristics, such as race. It is one thing to protect a class of
individuals that has been historically subject to employment
discrimination for reasons not involving an objectively negative
character trait, by being sensitive to how a seemingly neutral hiring
policy, like a no-conviction requirement, may have an identifiable,
221. In fact, it is reasonable to note that Wisconsin's inclusion of conviction records as a
prohibited basis for employment discrimination occurred in 1977, three years after Green v.
Missouri Pacific and in the heyday of cases involving this issue.
Given the
contemporaneousness of the Green decision and the EEOC's subsequent development of
guidelines for employers that consider criminal records in their employment decisions, it
seems that Wisconsin lawmakers were attempting to codify in the state's Fair Employment
Act the thrust of the emerging federal rule.
222. Under the WFEA, even if an employer's consideration of conviction records forms
only part of the basis for a hiring decision, a valid claim can be found. See Maline v. Wis. Bell,
ERD Case No. 8751378 (LIRC Oct. 30, 1989).
223. See Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).
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adverse effect on this group.

It is quite another thing to alter the

rationale so as to make persons convicted of criminal behavior an
independently protected class. When the law rates a trait such as the
evidenced involvement in criminal activity on par with immutable and
benign traits such as one's race and sex, it denigrates the importance of
protecting those groups truly being capriciously discriminated against.
It also deprives employers of the freedom to operate their businesses as
they desire, including not having their employees and customers being
forced to associate with a violent convicted felon, especially if that felon
has not exhibited any repentance or rehabilitation.
b. Tackling this Issue in the Federal Courts

Concerns about providing the force of legal protection to individuals
who are discriminated against solely due to their conviction record have
been articulated, rather forcefully, in some federal court decisions.
The first such critique actually occurred near the time of the original
decision in Green, when a closely divided Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals denied Missouri Pacific's petition for rehearing en banc.' 4 In
the denial order, three members of the Eighth Circuit, who would have
granted rehearing, presented a critical view of the rationale used by the
panel that had originally decided Green.2 This order, essentially a de
facto dissenting opinion to the original Green decision, took issue both
with the panel's weighing of the factual issues presented in the case 6
and with its legal rationale. With regard to the latter, Chief Judge
Gibson stated that "[t]he rule enforced by Missouri Pacific... which
prohibited the employment of those with criminal records is not racially
224. Id. at 1299-1300.
225. Id. at 1300. These three judges were Chief Judge Gibson and Judges Stephenson
and Henley. Four judges voted to deny the rehearing, with Judge Webster being ineligible to
vote due to having sat in district court on preliminary matters in the case. Id. at 1299-1300.
226. Judge Gibson's opinion argued that the evidence did not adequately show that
black applicants were disqualified at a substantially higher rate than whites. Id. at 1300. The
majority had shown that from a total job applicant pool of 8488, the challenged policy had
disqualified 292 individuals, 174 black and 118 white. Id. at 1294. Since the applicant pool
was 39% black and 61% white, an expected random distribution of the 292 disqualified would
have been 114 black and 178 white. Id. at 1300. Instead, Judge Gibson agreed with the
district court's assessment of the statistical evidence aimed at proving disparate effect, calling
the disparity (ratio of 5.3% blacks excluded due to the policy to 2.23% whites) de minimus.
Id. He also emphasized that in "the year that Green was rejected, 29 percent of the
employees hired by MoPac in the St. Louis Metropolitan area were black, although blacks
comprised only 16.4 percent of that area." Id. (citing Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 381 F. Supp.
992, 998-1000 (E.D. Mo. 1974)).
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discriminatory. Rather, it discriminates against both blacks and whites
on the basis of their criminal records. "n
This statement captures the intellectual leap that one must make to
conflate discrimination based on conviction records with discrimination
based on the grounds specifically listed in Title VII. Judge Gibson,
while also noting the burdensome effect such a rule will have on
businesses, bemoaned what the majority had done with respect to this
expansion of "suspect" classes: "In effect, the present case has judicially
created a new Title VII protected class-persons with conviction
records. This extension, if wise, is a legislative responsibility and should
not be done under the guise of racial discrimination."m It appears that
these dissenting Eighth Circuit judges would have rather ensured that
employers' no-conviction hiring polices are not a mere pretext for
disparate treatment against racial minorities or other protected classes,
and limited the analysis to only such an inquiry.
More recently, a federal district court in Florida took direct issue
with the logic and conclusions found in Green.229 In assessing a Hispanic
plaintiff's claim of disparate impact under Title VII,' the court called
the Green decision "ill founded'" 1 and went so far as to accuse such
claims of harboring impermissible racial judgments, saying that the
plaintiff's "position that minorities should be held to lower standards is
an insult to millions of honest Hispanics."232
More pertinent was the district court's language describing how it is
criminal activity that should be considered the controlling character trait
when employers discriminate on the basis of conviction records, not the
racial classification to which an individual may belong. 23' District Judge
Gonzalez expresses this sentiment by stating, "Obviously a rule refusing
honest employment to convicted applicants is going to have a disparate
227. Id. at 1300.
228. Id.
229. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp. 723 F.
Supp. 734 (S.D. Fla. 1989). The case involved a shipping company's refusal to hire the
plaintiff, a Hispanic, as a full-time truck driver due to his prior felony convictions for receipt
of stolen property and the company's policy that, among other things, prohibited hiring
persons who have ever received a felony, theft, or larceny conviction that resulted in a prison
or jail sentence. Id. at 737, 742.
230. The plaintiff also asserted a claim of disparate treatment, which was denied by the
court. Id. at 755.
231. Id. at 752.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 753.
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impact upon thieves. That some of these thieves are going to be
Hispanic is immaterial."' m The judge then concluded, in direct
opposition to Green, that employers should be permitted to "refuse to
hire persons convicted of a felony even though it has a disparate impact
on minority members." ' Although this federal district court opinion is
clearly in the minority, and of little weight in terms of legal authority,'5
Judge Gonzalez's suggestions that employment discrimination against
criminals does no more than discriminate against social malcontents
convicted of unlawful behavior, and not minorities, is deserving of
recognition for its reasoning. Moreover, his concerns radiate even more
light on the problems with state legislatures openly taking the position
that former criminals deserve special protection for employment
discrimination.
These opinions, although against the grain of the Green majority and
other subsequent decisions, make two important points. First, they
exhibit that the rationale of the majority in Green has indeed been
criticized. Moreover, these disagreements arose contemporaneously
with the initial Green decision and continue to be expressed in doubt
over the Eighth Circuit's holdings. Second, they present a strong and
principled argument for caution in granting protection from
discrimination to individuals based solely on their criminal record,
independent of the effect this discrimination may or may not cause on
classes truly in need of protection from employment discrimination.
The criticisms are largely on the normative basis of a compelling need to
not confer to ex-convicts an independent status as a class protected from
discrimination. Furthermore, other courts, while less willing to openly
employ the same type of language used by judges in CarolinaFreight
and the Green petition for en banc review, still rule in a manner that
indicates an unwillingness to enforce the rule of Green too stringently. 27
234. Id. Judge Gonzalez then went so far as to exclaim that "[i]f Hispanics do not wish
to be discriminated against because they have been convicted of theft then, they should stop
stealing." Id.
235. Id. The court added, "To hold otherwise is to stigmatize minorities by saying, in
effect, your group is not as honest as other groups." Id.
236. This author is aware of no other federal or state court case applying Title VII to
discrimination based on conviction records to expressly rule against the Eighth Circuit's
holding and application of disparate impact analysis in Green. Furthermore, the EEOC has
clearly expressed its view that prohibiting employment solely on the basis of conviction
records violates Title VII. See, e.g., 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH), Conviction Records §604
2088 (1998).
237. See, e.g., Matthew v. Runyon, 860 F. Supp. 1347 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (finding summary
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c. Tackling this Issue in the Wisconsin Courts
In County of Milwaukee v. LIRC,28 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
squarely addressed the issue of the fundamental difference between

truly suspect classifications and a classification involving persons with
criminal records. 39 It did so during its analysis of the language of the
WFEA criminal record provisions and the court's determination of
legislative intent.2
The court looked at the WFEA's statutory
construction and noted the key differences between the nature of
"arrest record" and "conviction record" and the other listed categories
protected from discrimination.2 41 The court highlighted the critical

difference that "[a]ll of these... categories except [one] are
involuntarily acquired and one has a 'right' not to be discriminated
against because of them. , 242 The court then plainly drew the appropriate
distinction between these benign characteristics of individuals, as
compared to an individual's criminal record:
In contrast, being a criminal is a voluntary act-a matter of

choice. There is no "right" to be a criminal. On the contrary,
one who engages in it is universally regarded as anti-social. It
carries no "right" to engage in such activity. It alone of all the
listed categories describes 2ersons subject to fine and
imprisonment upon conviction. '
The court concluded that, precisely because there was a special
exception given to discrimination based on criminal records, the
legislature intended to treat criminals differently than the other classes

judgment for defendant after plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish a
prima facie case of disparate impact, even though employer may have considered plaintiff's
arrest and conviction records in denying employment).
238. 407 N.W.2d 908 (Wis. 1987).
239. Id. at 914.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. (emphasis added). These other categories are age, race, color, handicap, sex,
creed, national origin, and ancestry. Id. (citing WIs. STAT. § 111.32(5)(a) (1979-1980)). The
one exception mentioned by the court refers to creed, which the court distinguished from
conviction records by stating that creed "refers to religion, [which] we regard as a very
precious right of individual choice, to be fully protected by law." Id.
243. Id. (citing Wis. CONST. art. I, § 2, which states: "There shall be neither slavery, nor
involuntary servitude in this state, otherwise than for the punishment of crime, whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted." (emphasis added)).
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protected under the WFEA. 2"
While this discussion by the court, and the clear language and logic it
employed, were only undertaken to determine the underlying purpose
of the criminal record provision of the WFEA 5 it correctly articulates
why legal treatment of criminal records as a prohibited basis of
discrimination should be treated much differently than other individual
characteristics that are protected by laws against discrimination.
Moreover, these concerns echo those voiced by the dissenters to Green
in the federal courts.26 By glibly placing persons with conviction records
into the ranks of protected classes, the WFEA tacitly rates this trait
equally among race, sex, religion, age, and other such innocent
classifications. This mistake continues to haunt the WFEA conviction
record ban, as seen through its difficult history of application and the
fact that its support continues to wane.2 7
2. Criminal Activity as a Relevant Character Trait in Hiring Decisions
Employment discrimination laws must separate the laudable goal of
restricting employment discrimination based solely upon an individual's
inclusion in a class defined by an innocent and immutable trait from the
required duty of employers to base their employment decisions on the
character of an employee,, along with that employee's ability to
successfully perform a job. Without so doing, the law loses its moral
force and begins the process of having governments intercept rational
hiring decisions from employers.2 8 While most prohibited bases of
discrimination do not suffer this infirmity, the inclusion in the WFEA of
conviction records as an impermissible basis for discrimination
epitomizes this problem.
As alluded to earlier in this Comment, past criminal conduct
necessarily reflects upon someone's character and, with the seeming
exception of criminal records, character traits are usually permissible
244. Id. ("So it was made clear by the legislature that in dealing with convicted criminals
the fact of such criminality put them in a special category, different from the others listed.").
245. Id.
246. See supra Part m.A.1.b.
247. See supra Part lI.A.2.b-c.
248. For a similar formulation of this issue, see T. Markus Funk, A Mere Youthful
Indiscretion? Reexamining the Policy of Expunging Juvenile Delinquency Records, 29 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 885, 930 (1998) ("[T]he whole notion of expunging criminal records to
prevent employers from 'unjustly' discriminating against former criminals appears to be based
on the perception that legislators are somehow better positioned than employers regarding
the hiring of former criminals.").
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and even anticipated factors to consider in most employment decisions.
Why an applicant's criminal past (a community "disservice") should not
be allowed to be considered among such things as, for example, an
applicant's community service record, is a question supporters of the
WFEA criminal record provisions must answer. 249 Therefore, the entire
issue of whether an individual's criminal past relates to his qualification
for a job must be discussed with a significant degree of intellectual
dexterity if consistent principles are to remain within employment law.
However, this contention remains largely unanswered-and
unasked, for that matter-because many seemingly wish to disallow any
character considerations on the part of employers, at least in this
context.
For those supportive of the WFEA criminal record
prohibition, along with a broader application of federal disparate impact
law with regard to the use of criminal histories, the permissible analysis
begins and ends with a narrow definition of what constitutes "job
qualifications."' 0 Essentially, if an employer is unable to show that an
ex-convict is not vocationally qualified for the job at issue, that
individual should be hired.*1 Such a perspective makes a person's
criminal history largely, if not completely, irrelevant. This sentiment is
even found within the language of the WFEA. When Wisconsin
249. See T. Markus Funk, The Dangers of Hiding Criminal Pasts, 66 TENN. L. REV. 287,
304 (1998) (stating that, while questioning the expungement of juvenile conviction records,
"Itseems rather odd that an employer may refuse to hire an individual because of his poor
performance in high school algebra, but that the same person's prior conviction for rape
should be hidden from the employer to protect his employment opportunities").
250. It should be noted that this matter of desiring employment discrimination laws that
push toward only allowing hiring decisions on the basis of qualities directly related to job
performance goes well beyond simply considerations of criminal records. Yet this entire
notion is at odds, both in an economic and legal sense, with the market model of
employment-which recognizes that all transactions, including those between employers and
employees, are based on subjective values of the parties involved. See EPSTEIN, supra note
161, at 163-65. Therefore, a rule of law that attempts to establish the range of "valid" criteria
in an employment decision will necessarily construct a list of job qualifications that may or
may not reflect those actually desired by employers seeking the most "productive"
employees. A complete discussion of this issue is unfortunately outside the scope of this
Comment. For a complete discussion of this issue, see EPSTEIN, supra note 161. The point is
made simply to draw the reader's attention to the rationale underlying the criticism of
allowing character considerations in employment decisions, when those considerations are
deemed irrelevant to the functional job responsibilities of the employee.
251. See, e.g., Kindem v. City of Alameda, 502 F. Supp. 1108, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 1980)
(stating in an equal protection claim against a city policy restricting employment of ex-felons
that "it has not been demonstrated that the sole fact of a single prior felony conviction
renders an individual unfit for public employment, regardless of the type of crime committed
or the type of job sought").
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legislators articulated the purposes of the WFEA, they talked of
ensuring that employment decisions are made on the merit of one's
"qualifications" and not his inclusion in a specific class.' In making
these types of statements, and concurrently inserting individuals with
conviction records as one of those classes, the necessary understanding
is that criminal records have no bearing on one's fitness for a job, at
least no greater a relation than one's race or sex.
This position is untenable. First, despite a prevailing mentality that
employers are (or at least should be) entirely restricted from using any
subjective, non-job-related basis for their employment decisions, the
doctrine of at-will employment still governs employment lawl 3
Furthermore, "[f]requently misunderstood is the legal truth that the
criteria used in employment decisions do not have to be job-related
unless they have a discriminatory impact upon a protected class. ,2
Therefore, employers working under the hiring doctrine of
employment-at-will can incorporate a multitude of idiosyncratic
predilections about the types of personalities they wish to employ, and
among these personality traits would likely be an applicant's proclivity
to criminal behavior.25
Second, most inquiries made into applicants' qualifications
invariably deal with some element of their character, including whether
their past activities reflect a work ethic suitable to the employer.
Character assessment must, to at least some degree, be permitted in the
employment context, and it is unquestionable that criminal activity
reflects upon someone's character-again, to at least some degree.
Therefore, when an employer determines an applicant's fitness for a job,
certainly that applicant's history of criminal behavior has a direct
bearing on that assessmentf26
252. Wis. STAT. § 111.31 (1999-2000); see also supraPart II.A.1.
253. Mark D. McGarvie, Personality:May It Sway Employment Decisions?, Wis. LAW.,
Dec. 1991, at 21,21.
254. Id. at 22.
255. See, e.g., Stephen E. Gottlieb, Three Justices in Search of a Character:The Moral
Agendas of Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 219, 245 (1996)
(explaining how Supreme Court Justices have established an employment law jurisprudence
where the "concerns are individual, and employment decisions should be based on personal
characteristics, including one's quality, ability, and resources for the job").
256. See, e.g., Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 510, 523, 76 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1219, 1228 n.7 (1988) (recognizing the argument that while Title VII
restricts the use of conviction records by employers, conviction records are "certainly relevant
in determining an employee's fitness or 'unfitness' for a job") (quoting Letter from Fred J.
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example, under Wisconsin law, an employer is not deemed to have
committed employment discrimination on the basis of conviction record
if the employer's action is motivated by the underlying conduct of the
employee, and not simply by the fact that the employee was convicted
for the conduct.' In articulating this point, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court mentioned that such an analysis relates to a legitimate character
assessment on the part of employers.28 The court opined that
"[a]nalyzing prior crimes evidence with respect to its relevancy to
character is clearly not prohibited."' 9 Moreover, an applicant's honest
character, reflected in his propensity to commit crimes, seems incredibly
important to employers making hiring decisions.'
Furthermore, the
case history of Wisconsin's substantial relation exception shows
instances in which administrative law judges have weighed personality
factors into their determinations of deciding, ostensibly at least, whether

the circumstances of the crimes committed by an applicant relate to the
circumstances of the job. 6 Overall, it takes a great deal of intellectual

Hiestand, counsel for the Association for California Tort Reform, to Governor Edmund G.
Brown (Sept. 3, 1980)).
257. See, e.g., City of Onalaska v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 354 N.W.2d 223
(Wis. Ct. App. 1984) (allowing employment termination based on an investigation of the
employer as to the underlying illegal actions of the employee, and not based on the fact that
the employee had been arrested); see also WASSERMAN, supra note 83, § 3.19 (discussing
Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development, Equal Rights Division, decisions to this
effect).
258. County of Milwaukee v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 407 N.W.2d 908, 916 n.4
(Wis. 1987). This point was raised in a discussion by the court about the relationship between
the substantial relation exception and the treatment of criminal record information under the
Rules of Evidence, WIS. STAT. §§ 904.04, 906.09(1) (1979-1980).
259. County of Milwaukee, 407 N.W.2d at 916 n.4.
260. See, e.g., Equal Opportunity Employment Comm'n v. Carolina Freight Carriers
Corp. 723 F. Supp. 734, 753 (S.D. Fla. 1989). Specifically, the court stated,
[T]o say that an applicant's honest character is irrelevant to an employer's hiring
decision is ludicrous. In fact, it is doubtful that any one personality trait is more
important to an employer than the honesty of the prospective employee....
It is exceedingly reasonable for an employer to rely upon an applicant's past
criminal history in predicting trustworthiness.
Id. But cf. May, supra note 216, at 194-202 (arguing against the effect on ex-felons of
character components to state licensing laws).
261. See, e.g., Thomas v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Wis. Personnel Comm'n Dec.
No. 91-0013 (Apr. 30, 1993) (finding that even when "the circumstances [of a job] are not
particularly conducive to committing the particular crime of which an employee has been
convicted," the employer may weigh the personality traits required of the job against those

2002]

CONVICTION RECORD DISCRIMINATION

parsing to define a legal rule that allows employers to perform usual
character assessment in their personnel decisions, while denying them
consideration of one of the best measures of character-the absence or
existence of criminal involvement. Yet the strict application of laws
against employers' use of criminal records in their decisions implicitly
disavows this element of an employer's hiring calculus.6 2
In this sense, the utter existence of anti-discrimination laws
protecting individuals with criminal records is antagonistic to the ability
of employers to make reasonable hiring choices. Unlike an employer
who professes or acts upon a desire to not associate with racial
minorities or women, the desire to avoid daily association with a person
convicted of serious crimes against persons and property is readily
justifiable, from both a personal and personnel perspective. For
example, if two equally qualified candidates for a job confront an
employer, and the employer picks a white applicant over a black
applicant, a clear basis exists to allege unlawful discrimination. Yet if
this logic is to apply in the same manner to equally qualified candidates
whose only difference was the fact that one had a felony criminal record
while the other did not, then we are left with an uncomfortable resultwhen such a factor is dispositive in the employment decision, which
hardly seems unreasonable, a valid claim almost certainly arises under
the WFEA. Under federal law, it appears such a decision is more
permissible, as the disparate treatment of an individual with a criminal
record is not legally dispositive for an employment discrimination
claim6 3 Instead, Wisconsin law should recognize that character
assessment serves, if not as part of an ex ante criteria for a job, at least as
a measure of distinguishing between directly competing applicants.
exhibited by the commission of a crime).
262. In some instances these laws go so far as to explicitly disallow the underlying
rationale that a criminal record reflects on an applicant's character. See, eg., N.Y. CORRECT.
LAW § 752 (Consol. 1987) (explicitly prohibiting employers from denying employment to
someone by reason of a finding of lack of "good moral character" when such finding is based
upon the fact that the applicant has previously been convicted of one or more criminal
offenses).
263. But see James P. Scanlan, The Bottom Line Limitation to the Rule of Griggs v. Duke
Power Company, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 705,737 n.125 (1985).
A rule.., allowing an employer, without business justification, to consider that one
of two candidates for a position had a conviction record as a reason to select the
other would conflict with Griggs, if that case is to have any real meaning, even
though the employer would not consider the conviction an absolute bar.
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Furthermore, whether a criminal record goes to basic "character"
rather than to particular "fitness" and "qualification" for job
performance is a taxonomy unnecessary to be undertaken if one
concedes that employers are in the best position to weigh the interests of
their businesses, and also that of their employees and customers.?6 In
the employment context, hiring decisions are, by definition,
"discriminatory," as applicants are to be chosen over other applicants
for the same job based on some reason.2 Employment discrimination
laws serve only to restrict the bases for these judgments to anything but
factors such as race, religion, et cetera. 6 Therefore, generally speaking,

unless a factor that an employer considers either directly or indirectly
implicates a protected class (e.g., racial minorities, women), it remains
with the employer's discretion to weigh that factor.

7

This is why

Wisconsin's expressed protection to criminals is so pernicious; it both
limits the freedom of employers and does so by forcing the equating of

criminal activity considerations with racial consideration, in terms of
both being irrelevant to an employment decision.
There is a recognized legal principle to ward off employers that
might abuse a right of character assessment as a mere pretextual means
of racial discrimination. Admittedly, the weighing of an applicant's or
employee's character is a subjective exercise, and all subjectively based
employment decisions are reviewable for their lawfulness under
disparate impact analysis. 26 Therefore, if the application of an
264. This view is somewhat analogous to the common law "business judgment rule,"
which is "a judicially created doctrine that limits judicial review of corporate decision-making
when corporate directors make business decisions on an informed basis, in good faith and in
the honest belief that the action taken is in the best interests of the company." Einhorn v.
Culea, 612 N.W.2d 78,84 (Wis. 2000).
265. Moreover, discrimination, generally speaking, is not a vice, but simply a condition
of human existence. It goes on every day in the actions of individuals who must decide, ergo
discriminate, between life's choices. This occurs, for example, in the products they wish to
buy, which social gatherings they wish to attend, how much time to spend working on a given
project, and so forth, almost indefinitely.
266. See, e.g., Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of Am., 332 F. Supp. 519, 521 (E.D. La. 1971)
("No federal statute prohibits discrimination per se; rather, what is prohibited is
discrimination that is racially motivated."). The other primary purpose offered for why
employment discrimination laws exist is to ensure that employment decisions are based
predominately on merit and one's potential job performance. For a discussion of the general
problems with this basis, see EPSTEIN, supra note 161.
267. McGarvie, supra note 253, at 22.
268. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (holding that a bank's
promotion policies based on subjective evaluations by supervisors can be subject to disparate
impact analysis). The United States Supreme Court held that employment decisions applying
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employer's subjective considerations (here, the connection between

one's criminal past and character for a job) creates a disparate impact
against a protected class, then it may be challenged. Moreover,
although many courts have alluded to the need on the part of an
employer to have a policy or repeated practice of actions that would
create a disparate impact, at least one federal circuit has stated that but

a single decision by an employer may be actionable under a disparate
impact theory.

9

If an employer may look back at one applicant's involvement in, for
example, an extracurricular organization while attending college as a

measure of that person's merit, it is entirely inconsistent to deny that
same employer consideration of the fact that another applicant was, for
instance, serving prison time for an armed robbery offense at this same
point in his life. In other words, the logical difficulty with disallowing
discrimination based upon a very legitimate mutable characteristic of
someone, while concurrently allowing consideration of other characterbased factors, is palpable.20
3. The Needed Permissibility of Crime-Specific Considerations in

Hiring
Similar to the matter of criminal records relating generally to an
individual's character, is the fact that different crimes may reflect
differently on one's desirability for employment. Certain crimes reflect
more noticeably on one's character, and some employers may therefore
desire to weigh different crimes differently. For example, consider
subjective standards, as opposed to standardized tests or other, objective qualifications, may
also be challenged under theories of disparate impact. Id. at 990 ("We are also persuaded
that disparate impact analysis is in principle no less applicable to subjective employment
criteria than to objective or standardized tests.").
269. Council 31, Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Ward, 978 F.2d 373,
377-78 (7th Cir. 1992). Nonetheless, the general legal principle remains that "[i]n the absence
of additional evidence of discriminatory intent, using subjective criteria in employment
decisions does not alone make out a pattern or practice of discrimination." McGarvie, supra
note 253, at 23.
270. Furthermore, employment policies against hiring applicants based on conviction
records are not an "artificial barriero to equal employment opportunity" in that the only
rational basis one would have to deny employment on those grounds would be out of malice
for persons with that trait. Lye, supra note 204, at 319. Such an argument must only presume
that functional job performance, a sometimes equally abstract notion, is the only permissible
consideration an employer may make. The inference, again, is that any measure of character
assessment must not only be questioned, but legally restricted. Yet character assessment is
permitted under the law, and it would take a realignment of social norms to label a history of
criminal behavior as "artificially" related to such a consideration.
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employers who may hire most qualified applicants with criminal records,
but who draw the line with individuals that have committed what the
employers deem as particularly heinous crimes. In other words, one
may also foresee the interest of an employer to deny employment to
persons convicted of particular crimes, not because the crime is directly
related to an element of the business, but because the nature of the
crime is so repugnant to the ownership or current employers of that
business, who must associate with such persons if they were to become
employees.
After Green v. MissouriPacificRailroad" and under present EEOC
guidelines," an employer under Title VII is not permitted to develop an
absolute screen based on criminal record and thereby deny employment
to any applicant who has been previously convictedY.3 This limitation
holds even if the employer does faithfully and strictly apply the policy to
all applicants and all crimes.' 4 The force of this use of disparate impact
theory against blanket bans on the hiring of persons with criminal
records is predicated on a statistical reality that protected classes,
namely racial minorities, are disproportional among the ranks of those
persons with criminal records. Available statistics readily confirm this
supposition.25 The question then becomes whether hiring criteria that
deny employment against applicants convicted of specific types of
crimes is likewise unlawful, absent a showing of business necessity. For
example, can an employer refuse to hire persons convicted of either
murder or first-degree sexual assault, while hiring felons convicted of
other crimes? This is precisely what occurred in the Gerald Turner case
in Wisconsin ' 6 in which the company to which he applied for
employment had hired many ex-felons, even in the year prior to
Turner's application?"
EEOC guidelines seem to indicate that an employment policy that is
crime-specific can be justified if data show that minorities are not

271. 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).
272. 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH), Conviction Records § 604.10 2088 (1998).
273. Green, 523 F.2d at 1292.
274. 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH), Conviction Records § 604.10 2088 (1998).
275. In 1997, 31.6% of reported criminal arrests in the United States were made against
blacks, while 66.0% were made against whites. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 22, 222 (1998).

In 1998, blacks comprised 12.7% of the

total U.S. population, while whites comprised 82.5%. Id.
276. See supranote 123.
277. See Hruz, supra note 123, at 12.
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disproportionately convicted for that specific crime in the relevant

geographical area.2

Furthermore, federal court decisions and some

EEOC rulings have allowed consideration of criminal records on an

individualized basis.' 9 Some courts have appropriately recognized that
all criminal records are not created equal, and that applicants who have
been convicted for aggravated offenses or for multiple convictions may
have a bearing on an employer's determination of an individual's
suitability for a job.m This restriction of the analysis to specific crimes
can be further limited when the Green tests for disparate statistical
impact are employed, so as to restrict the reasonable geographic area
within which applicants are sought.21 These methods of formulating the
appropriate statistical comparison work to limit the scope of the
denominator in the ratio of blacks to whites, affected under the policy.
This allowance seems reasonable, since it appears that job-relatedness is
easier to prove when a particular crime is juxtaposed against a particular
job and within a particular geographic area. Likewise, an employer can
only react to the existing or potential pool of applicants it faces.
Yet by making criminals a specifically protected class, employers are
limited in offering applicant-flow data as a means to defend even limited
occasions of discrimination based on criminal record. An employer who
may have hired multiple employees with criminal records, but decided
not to hire a particular applicant because of a particularly heinous
criminal record, is precluded from offering as a defense evidence of their
past hirings of persons with conviction records.' Again, this is precisely
278. 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCII), Conviction Records-Statistics§ 604.10 2089 (1998).
279. See, e.g., Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of Am., 332 F. Supp. 519, 521 (E.D. La. 1971),
affd, 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972) (upholding a hotel's policy against hiring persons previously
convicted of theft and receiving stolen goods for job as hotel bellman); see also EEOC Dec.
No. 79-40, 1979 WL 6916 (Feb. 12, 1979) (stating that an employer may require that persons
employed in positions with access to valuable property have no convictions for serious theft
or property related crimes without violating the Title VII prohibition against race
discrimination).
280. See, e.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 326 (8th Cir. 1971) (recognizing the
permissibility of these considerations for a position as a firefighter given then need of
protecting fellow firefighters and the general public).
281. Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290,1293 (8th Cir. 1975).
282. For example, say an employer has hired twenty ex-felons in the past year, of which
ten were black and ten were white. If one applicant for a job at this employer (whether black
or white) was then not hired due to his commission of an offense the employer finds
particularly egregious, it would seem that evidence of these past hirings would weigh against a
showing that this basis both pervaded this employer's hiring decisions or that it was derived
from a racial animus.
Furthermore, it appears that the federal district courts may be amiable to the offering of
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the factual situation that existed in the dispute between Gerald Turner

and Waste Management, Inc.23
One may argue that this issue of permissible, crime-specific
considerations is encapsulated within the whole "job-relatedness"
question. In other words, it is the nature of both the substantial relation
test under the WFEA and the business necessity test under Title VII to
cause workers to compare the crime to the job. While this assertion
carries truth, the difference, again, is that, for some employers, it may be
solely the fact that an individual has committed a particular crime that
deters the employer; there is no connection made to the functional
responsibilities and performance expected on the job.
Regarding both crime-specific and character-specific considerations,
Wisconsin law works to frustrate these seemingly legitimate inquiries on
the part of employers, who bear the public and private burden of
selecting the most productive and most amicable applicants. By
essentially applying disparate treatment analysis in governing conviction
policy classifications, the law takes from employers the liberty to
reasonably discriminate not only between vocationally qualified people
when some have criminal records and others do not, but also between
various types of criminal records.
Elimination of the WFEA conviction record bar would not deny
employers the ability (perhaps moral duty) to make their own
independent judgment over whether to hire persons with criminal
records. Unlike many state licensing laws, and some state laws that

evidence that a discerning use of conviction records (but not a total ban based on such
records) can be lawful discrimination. See A. B. & S. Auto Serv., Inc. v. South Shore Bank,
962 F. Supp. 1056 (N.D. Ill. 1997). Although this case concerned whether a bank's practice of
considering applicants' criminal records in making loan decisions had an unlawful disparate
impact on African-Americans, the court and the parties in the case extensively invoked the
arguments made from cases involving employment discrimination on the basis of conviction.
Id. at 1063 (citing, for example, to Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal.
1970)). In reaching its conclusion that the denied applicant failed to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination, the court noted that "the fact that the bank's practice of considering an
applicant's criminal record was not consistently applied to disqualify applicants with criminal
records .... Rather, the bank has made at least three business loans to applicants with
criminal records. One of these three applicants with criminal records is African-American."
Id. (citations omitted). Such reasoning suggests that, in the absence of the WFEA, Wisconsin
employers attempting to defend discrimination based on conviction records under Title VII
could rely on their history of prior hirings of persons with criminal records.
283. Waste Management, Inc., Turner's potential employer, had hired thirty ex-felons
between May 1999 and the time Turner filed his complaint in August 1999. See Hruz, supra
note 123, at 12.
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require employers to perform background criminal record checks,2 the
elimination of the WFEA's conviction record bar would not transform
the state of the law so as to automatically disqualify persons with

criminal records from some or all forms of public and private
employment. '

5

Instead, eliminating the WFEA conviction record

provision simply provides employers lawful discretion on how to weigh
conviction records, and places on ex-convicts the reasonable burden of
proving their rehabilitation and fitness for employment despite their
criminal records.
4. Negligent Hiring and Potential Liability to Employers
Unfortunately, one law's boon can be another law's bane. The
WFEA, by expressly limiting the ability of employers to discriminate
based on conviction records, may expose employers to liability under
the theory of negligent hiringf 6
Many states currently recognize negligent hiring as a tort action,
including Wisconsin.m The claim arises when an employer hires
someone they knew, or should have known, was prone to commit a
crime against a third party while performing the employee's job duties.28
284. See May, supra note 216,passim.
285. This point relates to the common argument that employers should not be allowed
to discriminate against previously convicted felons since they have already "paid their debt to
society." This argument would carry more weight if a law required employers to not hire
someone with a criminal record. Moreover, one's public punishment for his crime should not
negate an employer's private judgment as to how the reality of an applicant's conviction
record reflects his ability to work for that employer. See Hruz, supra note 123, at 7-15.
286. As one legal commentator suggested, "to avoid a negligent hiring claim, an
employer may well have to reject an applicant with a criminal record, notwithstanding the
possibility that the employer may be subject to liability under the WFEA." BACKER ET AL.,
supra note 83, § 5.24; see also Stephen J. Beaver, Comment, Beyond the Exclusivity Rule:
Employer's Liability for Workplace Violence, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 103, 115 (1997) ("[A]n
employer could be obligated to hire an ex-convict, despite the ramifications of such a
decision, if that individual is qualified for the position and the employer cannot cite any other
reason to exclude him or her other than criminal convictions."); Walter Olson, How
Employers are Forced to Hire Murderers and Other Felons, WALL ST. J., June 18, 1997, at
A23 (calling the link between potential negligent hiring claims and bars on discriminatory
hiring based on conviction records as being a "sued-if-you-do, sued-if-you-don't regime we
impose on hapless businesses").
287. Wisconsin courts only recently recognized a negligent hiring claim in Miller v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 580 N.W.2d 233 (Wis. 1998).
288. See, e.g., Guillermo v. Brennan, 691 F. Supp. 1151, 1158 (N.D. Ill. 1988). "Liability
for negligent hiring arises only when a particular unfitness of an applicant creates a danger of
harm to a third person which the employer knew, or should have known, when he hired and
Id.; see also
placed this applicant in employment where he could injure others."
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court has ruled that plaintiffs advancing a
negligent hiring claim in this state are required to show four elements,
which reflect the traditional elements of a common law negligence
action2 9 The plaintiff must show: "that the employer has a duty of care,
that the employer breached that duty, that the act or omission of the
employee was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injury, and that the act or
omission of the employer was a cause-in-fact of the wrongful act of the
employee. ,,2'0
It appears that negligent hiring is the "evil" counterpart to the
business necessity exception and the "substantial relation" exception
available under federal and state law, respectively. 1 This concern has
been articulated in the history of cases involving arrest and conviction
record discrimination. For example, in Gregory v. Litton, the seminal
case on Title VII's application to the use of arrest records in
employment decisions, the court stated that "[i]n this context 'business
necessity' means that the practice or policy is essential to the safe and
efficient operation of the business." 22 By alluding to safety concerns,
the court seems to indicate a latent understanding that criminals may
pose greater tendencies to mischief. This is especially true if the
potential employee, as part of his job duties, will have regular contact
with the general public and that involvement carries risk to thirdparties.293
Likewise, recall the test developed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court
in County of Milwaukee to determine whether the substantial
relationship exception is satisfied under the WFEA.294 At the root of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 307 (1965) (describing negligent hiring claims).
289. Miller, 580 N.W.2d at 233.
290. Id. at 241.
291. As stated by one commentator,
[t]he tort of negligent hiring addresses virtually the opposite problem posed by
absolute conviction bars. The tort imposes liability, not on employers who exclude
individuals from their workforce in reliance on extensive inquiries into longforgotten acts, but on employers who indiscriminately hire employees with only a
cursory review into background and qualifications.
Lye, supra note 204, at 360.
292. 316 F. Supp. 401,403 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
293. See Janet E. Goldberg, Employees with Mental and Emotional Problems:
Workplace Security and Implications of State Discrimination Laws, The Americans With

Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, Workers' Compensation, and Related Issues, 24
STETSON L. REV 201,225 (1994).
294. County of Milwaukee v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 407 N.W.2d 908 (Wis.
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court's elements-only test is a determination of whether the
circumstances of the job would foster criminal activity similar to that
which the applicant had previously committed.295 The court's emphasis
concerning whether the circumstances of the job relate to the
circumstances of the criminal offense reflects similar considerations
needed by employers attempting to avoid liability under negligent
hiring.
Given the relatively recent availability of a negligent hiring claim in
Wisconsin, the state's courts have not had occasion to address how this
claim comports with the WFEA's ban on the use of conviction records
as a reason to deny employment. Likewise, the LIRC has been silent on
the relationship of the WFEA criminal record provision and negligent
hiring. Yet one federal district court, applying Wisconsin law, did draw
a connection between a plaintiff's negligent hiring claim and the WFEA
criminal record provision.296 In this instance, the court invoked the
connection to deny the plaintiffs' claim.2 7 The court found that the
plaintiffs:
[c]annot rely on Defendants' failure to look into [the employee's]
criminal record to support their negligent hiring claim. Even
with the benefit of all reasonable favorable inferences, nothing
even hints that [the employee's] pre-hiring convictions
"substantially relate" to the circumstances of his job... [which
is] the condition necessary to trigger the statutory exception to
the prohibition against employers' inquiry into such
convictions.29
Notwithstanding the decision in Guillermo v. Brennan, it is certainly
reasonable that plaintiffs wishing to advance a claim of negligent hiring
against an employer under Wisconsin law will cite to the substantial

1987); see also supra Part II.A.2.b.iii.
295. County of Milwaukee, 407 N.W.2d at 916.
296. Guillermo v. Brennan, 691 F. Supp. 1151 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (applying Wisconsin law).
Although the Illinois federal district court conceded that Wisconsin seemingly did not allow a
negligent hiring claim, it proceeded nonetheless to apply the traditional negligent hiring
elements to the case. Id. at 1156-57.
297. Id. at 1161. The employee at issue had been convicted for felony burglary and
misdemeanor battery, while the job for which he worked for the defendants involved
installing insulation. Id. at 1153.
298. Id. at 1157 (citing WIs. STAT. ANN. § 111.333(1)(b) (1988)).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[85:779

relation language in the WFEA2 In fact, the tribunal handling such a
claim would be hard-pressed not to use analysis similar to that found
under the WFEA to judge whether an employer has acted correctly to
avoid negligent hiring, given that the question of whether the
circumstances of the job were related to the circumstances of the crimes
previously committed is material to both considerations.
It has been argued that the concern over negligent hiring liability is
not that great in application, even if in theory it seems plausible; that
prohibitions on employers using conviction records should not increase
liability for employers under negligent hiring.D This fact may very well
be true, but it may also be due to the hesitation on the part of courts to
strictly enforce negligent hiring torts, which may be a fortunate course in
its own right.0 1 Nonetheless, the mere fact that the question of negligent
hiring arises in the context of employment discrimination based on
conviction records only shows the inherent difference between criminal
records and other prohibited reasons for employment discrimination.
B. The "SubstantialRelationship" Exception: A Self-Indicting Flaw of
the Law and the Absence of a Workable Test
Having articulated an argument for why it is imprudent on a
normative level to grant legal protection from employment
discrimination to individuals based on their conviction records, we can
also address whether a law constructed to that effect can operate in a
meaningful and consistent manner. The legal history of the WFEA's
conviction record ban seems to answer this question in the negative.
299. Witness the discussion of the court in Guillermo:
[O]ne of Guillermos' complaints is that Defendants made no pre-hiring inquiry into
whether Brennan had a criminal record. In that respect Wisconsin law prohibits
employers from refusing to hire an individual based on his or her arrest or
conviction record .... Under that statute an employer can inquire into an
employee's criminal record and base an employment decision on that record only
when "the circumstances of the charge substantially relate to the circumstances of
the particular job or licensed activity .... '. Thus if Wisconsin law applies,
Defendants were clearly justified in not requiring a check on Brennan's criminal
record.
Id. at 1156 (citing WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.31 to 111.335 (1988)).
300. See, e.g., Lye, supra note 204, at 360-61.
301. For a discussion of some of the troubles with the negligent hiring doctrine see
Dermot Sullivan, Note, Employee Violence, Negligent Hiring, and Criminal Records Checks:
New York's Need to Reevaluate Its Prioritiesto Promote Public Safety, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
581 (1998).
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The WFEA's criminal record "substantial relation" exception is
essentially the heart of the Act's ban on discriminatory use of criminal
conviction records. As was observed in Part II.A.1, how the legal
entities charged with interpreting the provision decide its effect will
directly determine the level of efficacy the conviction record bar has in
practice. The question remains whether a sound principle can govern
the interpretation of this exception. Moreover, what does this exception
tell us about the merit of the conviction record prohibition itself? And
finally, how does this exception compare to its counterpart in federal
law, the business necessity defense?
1. Workability of the "Substantially Related" Test
a. Directly Competing Interests:PrivateRehabilitationand Public
Protection

The preceding discussion on the questionable rationales for treating
former criminals as a protected class, per se, versus protecting minorities
who may be disproportionately harmed by policies against hiring
criminals, may be criticized for simply missing the point. Instead, the
argument may be that the merit of Wisconsin's law is precisely that it
protects former criminals from discriminatory behavior, because such
actions by employers, whether having a disparate impact on racial
minorities or not, are not conducive to efforts at criminal rehabilitation.
As the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated in County of Milwaukee, "It is
highly desirable to reintegrate convicted criminals into the work force,
not only so they will not remain or become public charges but to turn
them away from criminal activity and hopefully to rehabilitate them. "'2
This concern over the employment difficulties possibly facing exconvicts certainly permeates discussions about the general use of
conviction records by employers, both under Wisconsin law and at the
federal level.?m
302. County of Milwaukee v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 407 N.W.2d 908, 915
(Wis. 1987).
303. See, e.g., Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of Am., 332 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. La. 1971).
A past criminal record affords no basis to predict that a given person will commit a
future crime. But the evidence indicates that a group of persons who have been
convicted of serious crimes will have a higher incidence of future criminal conduct
that [sic] those who have never been convicted.
Id. at 521. Other state courts dealing with this issue have made similar arguments. See, e.g.,
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Yet we do not live in a perfect world, and the likelihood of criminal

recidivism remains high for many ex-convicts.3
Therefore, there
remains a social interest in allowing persons who must come into contact
with individuals formerly convicted of crimes reasonable means to
secure their safety. This interest is no less existent in workplace
environments.0 5 In County of Milwaukee, the court noted that the
legislature's criminal record provision and its substantial relation
exception attempts to balance the competing interests of employers that
wish to ensure a safe and efficient workforce with the interest of exconvicts seeking reintegration into society? ° The court seemed to be
recognizing, quite appropriately, the certainty that these two interests

necessarily compete. This discord, therefore, requires the establishment
of a legal rule that will, at a minimum, favor the accomplishment of one
interest over the othercl
Hunter v. Port Auth., 419 A.2d 631, 634 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) ("To foreclose a permissible
means of gainful employment because of an improvident act in the distant past completely
loses sight of any concept of forgiveness for prior errant behavior and adds yet another
stumbling block along the difficult road of rehabilitation.") (quoting Sec'y of Revenue v.
John's Vending Corp., 309 A.2d 358, 362 (Pa. 1973)). There is also an arguable policy
connection between employers using conviction records in hiring decisions and the ability of
present and former welfare recipients to gain employment. See Sharon Dietrich et al., Work
Reform: The Other Side of Welfare Reform, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 53 (1998).
304. According to the United States Department of Justice, an estimated forty-three
percent of those on probation between 1986 and 1989 were subsequently arrested at least
once on felony charges within three years after having been placed on probation. U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM OF FELONS ON

PROBATION, 1986-1989, at 1 (Feb. 1992).

305. In fact, given the rash of workplace violence in recent years, employers seemingly
need to be afforded even more latitude in their hiring. See generally Beaver, supra note 286,
passim. See also the discussion over negligent hiring and discrimination based on conviction
records supra Part III.A.4.
306. County of Milwaukee, 407 N.W.2d at 914-15. According to the court:
It is evident that the legislature sought to balance at least two interests. On the
one hand, society has an interest in rehabilitating one who has been convicted of
crime and protecting him or her from being discriminated against in the area of
employment. Employment is an integral part of the rehabilitation process. On the
other hand, society has an interest in protecting its citizens. There is a concern that
individuals, and the community at large, not bear an unreasonable risk that a
convicted person, being placed in an employment situation offering temptations or
opportunities for criminal activity similar to those present in the crimes for which he
had been previously convicted, will commit another similar crime. This concern is
legitimate since it is necessarily based on the well-documented phenomenon of
recidivism.
Id. (footnote omitted).
307. See Lye, supra note 204, at 320 (calling these competing social priorities); Myers,
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Both Wisconsin courts and the federal courts have wrestled with the
balancing of these competing interests. The Eighth Circuit in Green was
noticeably cognizant of the effect such polices can have on the ability of
ex-felons to find and maintain employment, remarking that such policies
may have the tendency to "place every individual convicted of any
offense... in the permanent ranks of the unemployed. "'

In County of

Milwaukee, the court's decision recognized that "[e]mployment is an
integral part of the rehabilitation process ""' and that society has
interests in both protecting its citizens and also in rehabilitating persons
convicted of crime, which may include their protection from
employment discrimination."'0
The Wisconsin Supreme Court
remarked, however, that "[i]n balancing the competing interests ... the

legislature has had to determine how to assess when the risk of
recidivism becomes too great to ask the citizenry to bear."3"' The court
concluded that the Wisconsin legislature answered this question in the
form of the substantial relation test, which exists precisely to compare
the circumstances of the offense to a particular job.

Meanwhile,

supra note 43, at 910-11. Myers, while recognizing that these concerns are in "direct
conflict," argues that the court in County of Milwaukee impermissibly rebalanced these
competing social policy goals. Id. at 911. He argues instead that the legislature's
determination of how this balance should operate was manifested in the substantial relation
test. Id. at 913-16.
308. Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290, 1298 (8th Cir. 1975); see also supra Part
II.C.2.
309. County of Milwaukee, 407 N.W.2d. at 915.
310. Id. at 914-15.
311. Id. at 915-16.
312. But see Myers, supra note 43, at 913-16 (arguing that while the court recognized
that the legislature employed the substantial relation test to balance these interests, the court
also utterly failed to adhere to the construction of the provision as intended by the
legislature). It is instructive to realize exactly how the substantial relation provision modifies
the general ban against using conviction records for discriminatory purposes. In County of
Milwaukee, the Wisconsin Supreme Court discussed the effect that the absence of the
exception would have had on employers desiring to consider conviction records. County of
Milwaukee, 407 N.W.2d at 914. It stated that without the exception, "an employer could
not.., refuse to hire a person because that person had a conviction record. This would be
true in a case where the conviction had been on charges of sexual molestation of children and
the individual applied for a job as a day care supervisor." Id. The court then suggested that
such a result was against the manifest intent of the legislature and, in the words of the court,
"It would be simply unconscionable to require employers in the example above to be forced
to hire such an individual or face charges of discrimination." Id.
Conversely, although the court does not speak to this, in the absence of the WFEA
criminal record prohibition, employers would be entirely free to use conviction records as a
basis in their employment decisions (in the absence of a violation of federal law under Title
VII, of course). The main point is that without some statutory exception, the result would be
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federal courts have applied the business necessity test to imperfectly
attempt this balance.313 The questions are what is the best manner in
which to balance these interests, and which should be favored?
Certainly, the determination of which social interest should be
granted preference is precisely the type of social policy decision that
representative legislatures must weigh. Therefore, if an expressed
preference is given to the goal of securing to ex-convicts equal
employment opportunities, then that is the rule courts are to follow.
Nonetheless, in the absence of clear legislative intent, courts may
reasonably conclude under the law that alleviating the burdens on a
lawful business trump the granting of indiscriminate employment
opportunities to any and all persons with criminal histories. This
approach would require a great deal of deference on the part of
employers to determine whether the "circumstances of a crime" relate
substantially to the "circumstances of the particular job," as required
under the VFEA.314 In any event, due consideration should be given by

lawmakers and judges as to whether the more appropriate legal rule
would be one that places the burden of proving one's ability to work
without destructive conduct on ex-criminals and not on lawful
businesses.
The issue of mitigating circumstances plays directly into this
discussion of the competing interests of recidivism and public safety
versus rehabilitation and equal employment opportunities. At least one
administrative application of the WFEA criminal record provisions has
recognized that the passage of time in which an ex-criminal has been
subsequently free from criminal behavior can be "a significant factor in
balancing the overall goal ...of preventing discrimination on the basis
of conviction record against the goal ... of protecting the employer

against unreasonable risks.""31 The notion seems to be that as time
progresses, the concern over recidivist action in the workplace should
give way to the realization of employment opportunities for ex-convicts.
The difficulty, though, is in deciding who should determine when these
a law (or absence of law) that would decisively favor one or the other of these competing
interests. Instead, the substantial relation exception forces some type of a balancing test,
which has been largely determined by the considerations of the courts. See also supra Part
II.A.2.b.
313. See, e.g., Green, 523 F.2d at 1297-98; see also supra Part II.C.3.
314. WIS. STAT. § 111.335(1)(c) (1999-2000).
315. Thomas v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Wis. Pers. Comm'n Dec. No. 91-0013
(Apr. 30, 1993).
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factors balance in one direction or the other: employers through their
own discretion or governments through the force of law? 16 The WFEA
dictates that the latter route reigns, but it does so in a sometimes unclear
fashion.317
Also relevant to this discussion is the recognition that these concerns
about employment opportunities as a means of rehabilitation are due
solely to the recognition of persons with criminal histories as an
independently protected class. This concern does not directly, nor in
any meaningful manner, relate to the protection of other classes, such as
minorities.3 18 This fact is especially acute under Wisconsin law, which
has expressly limited discrimination against all persons with criminal
records.
Overall, it is certain that social policies tied to matters of criminal
recidivism and the availability of employment to ex-felons remain at the
root of laws restricting employment discrimination on the basis of
criminal records. 9 The inclusion of criminal records as a protected
basis of discrimination has occurred for a reason, albeit one that simply
presumes the interests and discretion of ex-convicts trump those of
employers. For example, one commentator has framed the discussion to
be one of the competing interests of "eliminating employment practices
with proven discriminatory effects and the entrepreneurial interests in
controlling the composition of the workforce." 3" But this is a terribly
biased and incomplete formulation of the issue. The interest of
employers to avoid hiring certain criminals also captures the interests of
their customers and other employees, who may prefer to not associate
with someone prone to criminal activity. These are not merely
"entrepreneurial" interests, but also societal interests.
b. Directly Competing Tests: Weighing the Factors-SpecificTest vs. the
Elements-Only Test
Much confusion and dismay has been generated by the practical

316. See supra Part III.A.2-3.
317. This problem with the WFEA criminal record provisions not giving adequate notice
to employers of what is required in a decision weighing conviction records is discussed infra
Part IILB.1.b.
318. Presumably, the concern is that all ex-convicts, whatever their race, should not be
denied equal employment opportunities. Therefore, the rationale of this policy applies
equally regardless of overlying concerns of racially disparate impact.
319. See Myers, supranote 43; May, supra note 216.
320. Lye, supra note 204, at 361.
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difficulties with determining how the WFEA's all-important exception
to the criminal record provision should apply. 2' As previously noted,
there have arisen two, general competing viewpoints.3 2 The first reflects

a view that the exception should be construed narrowly, such that the
relevant "circumstances" relate to the particular facts surrounding
criminal offenses, the time passed, mitigating circumstances, efforts at
rehabilitation since the conviction, and so forth. The second view
believes that the courts should only look to the elements of the crime as

the measure of "circumstances," and compare those elements to the job
duties in question. As we have seen, since County of Milwaukee, the
latter, elements-only approach has dominated the law's application."
This development is desirable. The benefit of looking only to the
statutory elements of the crime, and not the range of factual
circumstances of the offense, is that it keeps the LIRC and the courts

out of "the position of re-evaluating the question of criminal liability
which has already been resolved by a conviction."324 Furthermore,
looking to subsequent mitigating factors, such as rehabilitation and work

history, while possibly relevant to the employer's own subjective
judgment, makes questionable sense to apply as a legal standard
replicable in future cases.
Yet shortly after County of Milwaukee was decided, a critique of the
321. The exact language of the exception reads:
[I]t is not employment discrimination because of conviction record to refuse to
employ or license, or to bar or terminate from employment or licensing, any
individual who: (1) Has been convicted of any felony, misdemeanor or other offense
the circumstances of which substantially relate to the circumstances of the particular
job or licensed activity; or (2) Is not bondable under a standard fidelity bond or an
equivalent bond where such bondability is required by state or federal law,
administrative regulation or established business practice of the employer.
WIs. STAT. § 111.335(1)(c) (1999-2000).
322. See supra Part II.A.2.b.
323. See supra Part II.A.2.b.iv.
324. Lillge v. Schneider Nat'l, ERD Case No. 199604807 (LIRC June 10, 1998). In this
decision, the LIRC added that it (and the Wisconsin courts):
must be able to rely on the fact of conviction as establishing, beyond dispute, that
the convicted person engaged in the elements of the crime, and that there were no
mitigating facts or circumstances which would have made a lesser charge (or no
charge) more appropriate under the circumstances.
Considering the factual
circumstances of the offense as asserted by the convicted person is inconsistent with
this.
Id. slip op. at 7.
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decision was presented that focused

on

the various

available

formulations of the substantial relationship exception."' This critique
argued that the Wisconsin Supreme Court construed the WFEA
conviction record provisions, most notably its substantial relation
exception, so abstractly as to, using Justice Abrahamson's words,
"eviscerateli" the statute."' In doing so, it has been suggested that the

court ignored the legislative intent in adopting the statute, and all but
countenanced employment discrimination against persons with criminal
records, thereby denying them equal employment opportunities.3'

Putting aside the legislative intent issue,' the primary dispute
appears to be which characterization of the substantial relation
exception is preferable, the factors-specific approach or the elements325. See Myers, supra note 43. This article remains the most thorough critique of the
County of Milwaukee decision within the legal literature.
326. Id. at 891 (citing County of Milwaukee v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 407
N.W.2d 908, 919 (1987) (Abrahamson, J., concurring)).
327. Id. at 915-16.
328. The argument was based on the language appearing in the different drafts of the
1977 bill relating to the substantial relation exception:
The original bill introduced in the Assembly allowed discriminatory action because
of "any... offense which is substantially related to the ability of [the] person to
perform the duties of a particular job or licensed activity." The Legislative
Reference Bureau's analysis of that language, which was attached to the original
published bill, stated that "[d]iscrimination on the basis of a conviction is permitted
if the subject of the conviction is substantially related to the ability of the person to
perform the job or licensed activity." The Assembly Labor Committee submitted an
amendment, which the full Assembly passed, modifying the language of the
statutory exception into its final form. The legislature thus replaced the phrase
"any... offense which is substantially related..." with "any... offense the
circumstances of which substantially relate to...." In making that modification, the
legislature made mere determinations of the subject of an offense unlawful as
justification for discriminatory action. If the legislature had intended determinations
at a high level of abstraction to be lawful, there would have been no need to modify
the original language.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (alterations in original). In response, Myers' inference from the
legislative history is, like most allusions to legislative history, merely an inference. Moreover,
it seems clear that given that the past fourteen years since the Wisconsin Supreme Court
handed down County of Milwaukee have spawned no action to "reclaim" the teeth of the
WFEA criminal record ban (and in fact nearly all legislative action since has been motions to
eliminate the provision entirely), one could argue the Wisconsin Supreme Court's treatment
was not so distant from the legislature so as to compel them to clarify their view. Such
legislative action was taken by the United States Congress, in the form of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, directly in response to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove,
which had made similar, pro-employer changes in the relative burdens of employers and
employees in proving discrimination claims. See RUTHERGLEN, supra note 160, at 25-35.
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only approach? According to the critique, the factors-specific approach
is preferable.329 It touches upon Justice Abrahamson's criticism of the
majority's formulation of the substantial relation test, in which she said
that the test, after County of Milwaukee, had no well-defined meaning. 3"
In fact, the elements-only test is a much more straightforward test to
apply, precisely because it looks only to clearly restricted considerations,
namely the elements of the crime and the duties and context of the job.
Furthermore, one must be cognizant of the practical realities
employers face in hiring decisions, and the relation of these concerns to
their ability to avoid liability under the WFEA's criminal record
provision. In County of Milwaukee, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
indicated an understanding of the difficulty faced by employers under a
poorly specified test for establishing a substantial relation between a job
and a conviction record.331 The court mentioned that it is impractical for
employers to do a "full-blown factual hearing" because that would make
employment decisions get bogged down.332 Employers that are legally
held to the standards of a factors-specific approach, even if they attempt
in good faith to make the correct determination, face the prospect of the
LIRC or the courts second-guessing every such decision.333 Even Justice
Abrahamson, the champion of the factors-specific approach, stated in
her dissent to Lyndon Station that:
I believe it is error for this court to make the determination, as it
does here, that the circumstances of Jessen's felony convictions
in 1973 substantially relate to the circumstances of his job as
police chief and that he is therefore disqualified from being
police chief in 1981. In my view the Law Enforcement Standards
Board (LESB), not this court, should make this determination.
In making the determination itself the majority has, I believe,
usurped the powers of the LESB and of the Village Board of
329. Myers, supranote 43,passim.
330. County of Milwaukee, 407 N.W.2d at 919 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
331. Id. at 917.
332. Id.
333. This indeterminacy is compounded by the fact that, even if an employer's use of the
substantial relation exception is valid, claims can still be threatened to be brought against the
employer. Such employers will need to spend a significant amount of legal resources to
defend against discrimination claims that, because they are fact-specific, will require intensive
fact-finding and will not likely be susceptible to summary judgments by courts. See Olson,
supra note 286, at A23 ("[Flew employers can risk spending years and fortunes in court
validating such a policy - or risk a big back-pay award should a court disagree with them.
When in doubt, an employer has an incentive to take the applicant.").
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Lyndon Station; [and] has exceeded its appellate jurisdiction by
acting as a factfinder.Y
It appears that it is the elements-only test that best allows for
employment-related decisions to be made "not by the court," but
instead by those involved in the decision-whether a law enforcement
standards board or the manager of a local department store. Moreover,
given the difficulty facing employers making these inherently subjective
decisions, it is not wise to put the threat of law behind such choices
except for possibly the most egregious cases.
Furthermore, the elements-only test is bolstered by the fact that a
criminal conviction is itself a delineation of relevant factors surrounding
a crime. Those who advocate the factors-specific test have erroneously
drawn upon the history of discrimination based on arrest record and
applied the same rationale in developing a legal test to discrimination
based on conviction record. Yet these two categories, while similar, are
different in material ways.335 Conviction records, unlike mere arrest
records, do carry probative value to an employer, given that convictions
are based on an actual finding of guilt accomplished through an
evidentiary-laden, adversarial process."' Use of the factors-specific test
diverts attention away from this difference and its benefit in the context
of the substantial relation exception to the WFEA. The factors-specific
test is more reasonable to apply to the more restrictive use of arrest
records, which is still allowed if the discrimination is based not on the
fact of the arrest, but on the underlying circumstances and factors that

334. Law Enforcement Standards Bd. v. Vill. of Lyndon Station, 305 N.W.2d 89, 101-02
(Wis. 1981) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Abrahamson made this
point to show that the LESB had failed to determine whether a substantial relation existed
between the crimes and the job, and that the court was impermissibly doing this factual
determination on its own. Id. at 102, 104-05. She also noted that the Village Board
undertook such a consideration and concluded that the circumstances of crimes and the job
were not substantially related. Id. at 104. Nonetheless, even had the LESB made a
determination that the circumstances were substantially related (as one could have inferred
even without the formality of the LESB making such determination on the record), it is
unlikely that Justice Abrahamson would have then said that she and her colleagues were
foreclosed from reviewing the merit of the LESB's conclusion.
335. See supra note 36.
336. See, e.g., 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH), Policy Guidance on the Considerationof
Arrest § 604.10 2094 (1998) ("Conviction records constitute reliable evidence that a person
engaged in the conduct alleged since the criminal justice system requires the highest degree of
proof.., for a conviction.").
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led to the arrest.337 By contrast, the elements-only test refers only to the
objective factors set out in a criminal statute-which, in the case of a
criminal conviction, have all been deemed satisfied by a court of law in
order to sustain a conviction.33' Looking past these considerations only
places employers, and the courts, into a conundrum of limitless factors
to be compared, weighed, and shuffled.
It is precisely this issue that sparked the Wisconsin legislature's
reconsideration of the criminal record provision, in which we see how
the substantial relation exception fails to illuminate a clear principle that
would allow the law to be applied in a consistent manner in practice. In
the case of Michael Moore,339 the LIRC determined that Moore's job as
a boiler attendant in a public elementary school -was not "substantially
related" to his crime of "'injury by conduct regardless of life.' "'M In
deciding in Moore's favor, the LIRC found that "as a matter of law,
work as a boiler attendant could never be considered substantially
related to a criminal conviction for conduct regardless of life or reckless
injury. 341 This conclusion was reached even though reckless injury
occurred to a child,342 and Moore would be working in a school. 3 The
twisted path the LIRC took to reach its conclusion exemplifies how
unprincipled application of the substantial relation test seemingly is.
The LIRC admitted that the criminal traits displayed by Moore's
conviction included a lack of concern for the safety and well-being of
others, a disregard for human life, and extremely poor judgment?"
Nonetheless, it found that there was nothing about a janitorial position
in a school that posed a greater-than-usual opportunity for criminal

337. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
338. According to the court in County of Milwaukee, "focusing on the elements [of the
crimes] simply help[s] to elucidate the circumstances of the offense." 407 N.W.2d 908, 917
(Wis. 1987).
339. See supra Part H.A.2.b.v.
340. Moore v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., ERD Case No. 199604335 (LIRC July 23,
1999).
341. Id.
342. Moore's conviction resulted from his throwing a pan of hot grease at his girlfriend
and severely burning the girlfriend's twenty-month-old daughter, who was standing between
them. Id.
343. Judge Ralph Adam Fine expressed in his dissent to the Court of Appeals' decision
that "[n]o level of deference justifies validating such an internally contradictory conclusion."
Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, No. 00-1956, 2001 WL
641791, at *10 (Wis. Ct. App. June 12,2001).
344. Id.
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behavior.35 In the Wisconsin Supreme Court's refusal to review this
case, the court declined to grapple again, for the first time since County
of Milwaukee, with how the substantial relation exception must be
interpreted and applied.
The decisions made during the Moore case exhibit at least three
important ramifications for the subsequent development of the WFEA's
conviction record provisions. First, it appears that the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals, at least in this instance, has discovered a standard of review
giving great deference to the conclusions of the LIRC. This result may
be questionable, given that the determination of whether a "substantial
relation" exists is a question of law, not fact,.6 suggesting there should
be de novo review with lesser deference to the agency. Second, and
related, it is apparent that any employer (or employee) is now unclear as
to how the conviction record provision of the WFEA, and its substantial
relation exception, will be applied by the LIRC with enough consistency
to govern employers' decisions. A law that can be applied for opposite
conclusions under similar facts appears to be no law at all, and is an
indictment of the current WFEA.34 7

Finally, with the Wisconsin

Supreme Court denying the petition for review to the Moore case-a
case that, at best, minimally adheres to the holdings of County of
Milwaukee-it seems likely that claims under this provision of the
WFEA will continue to materialize, and the court may have only
deferred its need to either clarify, reinvigorate, or abandon its decision
in County of Milwaukee.

In sum, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in County of Milwaukee
discredited the need to rely on the underlying facts during and after the
commission of the crime, and instead concluded that it "is the
34
circumstances which foster criminal activity that are important.""
While a move in the right direction, even this test relies on a level of
clairvoyance over the likelihood of recidivist criminal behavior in a
particular employment setting that seems difficult to achieve and
345. Id.
346. County of Milwaukee v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 407 N.W.2d 908, 917-18
(Wis. 1987).
347. The Milwaukee County Circuit Court hearing the Moore appeal from the LIRC
admitted to the conundrum it faced. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs. v. Labor & Indus. Comm'n,
Case No. 99-CV-6637, available at http://www.dwd.state.wi.us/lirclmoorcrct.htm (last visited
Jan. 13, 2002). Judge Frank stated, "This case illustrates just how difficult the fair and
reasoned application of this law can be...." Id.
348. County of Milwaukee, 407 N.W.2d at 916.
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terribly discretionary to judge. Therefore, perhaps the reason there
appears to be so little principle and uniformity in the application of the
WFEA conviction record law is because devising a rule of law in which
such characteristics are allowed limited consideration will necessarily be
fraught with confusion. Yet, unlike previous criticisms of the County of
Milwaukee decision, this contention does not necessarily go to the merit
of the court's ruling.349 In fact, given the existence of the law, and its
exception, the elements-only approach is the most reasonable
application of the rule, as the law's application under that approach is
more operable than the competing, factors-specific interpretation of the
test. The nebulous exception provision that administrative agencies and
courts must apply is a child of the legislature, and it seems necessary for
that branch of government to provide a guidance that is presently
nonexistent.
2. Comparison to Federal Civil Rights "Business Necessity" Standard
Just as Wisconsin's Fair Employment Act allows employment
discrimination on the basis of a conviction record if the circumstances of
the criminal offense substantially relate to the circumstances of the job,
federal law provides employers with a similar exemption: the business
necessity exception.50 Although there remains significant confusion as
to the true nature and burden required by a business necessity defense
to discrimination based on conviction record,351 the business necessity
test applied under federal law has a much richer history
than
352
Wisconsin's own analogous "substantial relationship" exception.
By construction and application, the substantial relation exception
deals in neither a bona fide occupational qualification (the defense
required to defend a disparate treatment claim under Title VII) nor a
business necessity (the defense required to defend a disparate impact
349. This Comment cites the problems with the County of Milwaukee decision only to
highlight the flaws inherent in any test applied by the courts to the current law. Despite the
preceding argument in favor of the elements-only test, it appears that neither formulation has
an entirely clear meaning-nor could any test; it is the nebulous nature of the exception that
makes it exceedingly difficult to define a clear rule that can apply equally well on a case-bycase basis.
350. See supra Part II.C.3.
351. See supra Part II.C.3 and accompanying notes.
352. Unlike Wisconsin, this exception grew out of the equitable views of the courts, and
was not codified into a statutory scheme, until the Civil Right Act of 1991. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(k) (1994); see also RUTHERGLEN, supra note 160, at 21 (explaining how the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 codified the three-stage structure of shifting burdens of proof).
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claim under Title VII). Instead, the exception acts as some type of a
hybrid. It wades between emphasizing how a conviction relates to job
performance potential and whether no-conviction polices are
themselves suspect, absent on impact on other protected classes. Again,
this occurs because Wisconsin law takes the unique route of listing
criminal convictions as a specific class receiving employment
protection."
C. Peer Review: Looking to the Treatment of Conviction Record
Considerationsin Employment Decisionsby the Majority of States

With the vast majority of states failing to include within their fair
employment laws provisions protecting persons with a criminal record
from employment discrimination, 354 it may be questioned whether
Wisconsin's uniqueness is desirable. Wisconsin is clearly in the minority
in viewing such a policy as either in the public interest, being
administratively feasible, or effective.
Of those few other states that have statutorily codified a legal
prohibition against discrimination based on criminal records, or have
articulated a reasonably discernable test through case law, Wisconsin
may have something to learn. One commentator has suggested that
Wisconsin follow the New York model, and have the state legislature
insert within the WFEA statute a specific list of factors to be considered
in making the substantial relation decision.355 If the WFEA criminal
record ban is to remain, such an action may be desirable. Yet, it is
doubtful that such a change will do little more than alter the
presumptions facing either employers or employees and redirect the
type of evidence that must be put forward to rebut or support a
discrimination claim.
Given that Wisconsin already leads the state-level jurisprudence on
this issue, perhaps Wisconsin has more to learn from the roaring silence
coming from the vast majority of states: a law restricting employers from
reasonably discriminating against former criminals is unnecessary and
undesirable. Moreover, in these other states, aggrieved individuals still
353. One could even argue, given the elements-only test now applied to the "substantial
relation" exception post-County of Milwaukee, that the federal test under business necessity
is more stringent and difficult for an employer to satisfy. If this observation is true, persons
alleging discrimination on the basis of conviction record in this state may already have a great
likelihood of succeeding with their claim if it is brought under a claim of a Title VII violation.
354. See supra Part U.B.
355. Myers, supra note 43, at 897.
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have a cause of action under federal law, to the extent they can properly
allege a disparate impact on an otherwise-protected class.356

D. Legal Effect of Eliminatingthe Conviction Record Basis of the
WFEA

Having advocated the deletion of the conviction record provisions
from the WFEA, there remains the practical question of how
employment law will look after this change. The preceding analysis has
highlighted some of the important, recurring themes involving the issue
of whether employers should be able to discriminate based on an
employee's or potential employee's conviction record. While many of
these legal issues apply both to the federal and Wisconsin legal
treatment of this issue, a few important differences remain.
1. Resulting Status of Considering Conviction Records Absent the
WFEA Conviction Record Provision
Currently, an individual alleging employment discrimination based
on conviction records has the option of bringing suit under either
federal law (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act) or state law (WFEA)Y.
Given that a claim under the WFEA criminal record provision requires
only a showing of disparate treatment against those with criminal
records, while the Title VII necessitates a showing of disparate impact
against minorities, a claimant is likely to pursue his or her allegation
under Wisconsin law.
Elimination of this provision of the WFEA will merely deny special
employment protection to a class of persons whose members are
identified by one similar trait-the evidenced commission of destructive,
anti-social behavior. As a result, one's criminal record will join the
multitude of other factors that each separate employer may decide to
weigh in his or her employment decisions."' In this regard, one of the
most noticeable changes facing claimants of employment discrimination
based on conviction record involves the type of evidence that must be
356. See infra Part II.C and accompanying notes.
357. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1994). A Title VII claim brought under federal law will
preclude the claimant from bringing a similar claim arising out of the same fact pattern, on res
judicata grounds. Schaeffer v. State Pers. Comm'n, Dep't of Military Affairs, 441 N.W.2d 292
(Wis. Ct. App. 1989). Likewise, a claim under WFEA reviewed by Wisconsin courts will
likely bar subsequent litigation of the same claim under Title VII. See Kremer v. Chem.
Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
358. See McGarvie, supra note 253, passim.
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put forward to prove such claims.359 Upon deletion of the provision,
aggrieved employees will have to settle their claim under the burdens
established for Title VII disparate impact analysis. " Unlike under Title
VII's disparate impact test, a plaintiff alleging a WFEA claim is
currently not required to offer evidence, statistical or anecdotal, that
some other protected group, notably racial minorities, is
disproportionately harmed by a policy against hiring persons with
criminal records. Instead, once an employer invokes an applicant's
criminal record as part of its basis for failing to hire that applicant, the
analysis immediately turns to proof of a legitimate business reason for
that decision, viz. the substantial relation test.
The use of criminal records by employers to deny employment to
minorities, whether expressly or through a practice that has a disparate,
negative effect on minorities, will remain prohibited, as likely will

absolute bans on hiring persons with conviction records. 61 In other
words, even absent Wisconsin's conviction record bar, criminal records
cannot be used as a mere pretext for racial discrimination.
2. Make a Federal Case Out of It: The Benefit of the Title VII
Approach vs. Wisconsin's Current Attempt
One of the primary reasons why Wisconsin's Fair Employment Act
continues to bar considerations of conviction records in employment
decisions is a misguided tendency among its political and legal

359. See supraPart III.B.2.
360. For a summary of the resulting burdens in a Title VII disparate impact claim due to
the use of one's conviction record, see Kent County Sheriff's Ass'n v. County of Kent, 826
F.2d 1485, 1492 (6th Cir. 1987). The court stated:
In disparate (adverse) impact cases, the burden of proof shifts between the parties,
starting with the plaintiff, and a somewhat similar tripartite analysis is employed: (1)
the plaintiff must establish a substantial adverse impact on a protected class, (2) the
employer must prove a business necessity for the practice (e.g., job-relatedness of
the challenged requirement), and (3) the plaintiff must then prove that other
acceptable requirements with less adverse impact exist.
Id. (citing SCHLE1 & GROSSMAN, supra note 190, at 1287); see also supra Part II.C and
accompanying notes.
361. See Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975). Although this decision
has emanated from only one circuit of the federal court of appeals, no other circuit of the
federal court of appeals has ruled in direct opposition to Green. Furthermore, EEOC
Guidelines interpreting Title VII directly state that use of criminal conviction as an automatic
bar to employment is impermissible, unless the policy is justified by a business necessity. See
2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH), Conviction Records § 604.10 2088 (1998).
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supporters to equate the elimination of this provision with the tacit

allowance of employers to unabashedly discriminate against any and all
persons with a criminal record. 62 Such fears are unfounded, though, as
employers' use of conviction record information in personnel decisions
will remain governed, and limited, by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
Overall, Title VII law, combined with the ready aid of the EEOC, will
still protect Wisconsin citizens from truly invidious discrimination.
Furthermore, the deletion of this currently protected class from

discrimination claims neither explicitly nor implicitly condones
irrational discrimination based on criminal records; it simply permits
employers the discretion to openly weigh the importance of a conviction
to a job.363
Instead, to the extent that economic and business
considerations cause employers to decide that an applicant is the best

person for a job, despite his conviction record, that freedom will remain,
and judicious employers will still hire the most productive worker for
the job.3"4
Of all the prohibited bases of discrimination in the WFEA,
consideration of conviction record should go the way of the dust bin.

Granting to convicted criminals a claim of disparate treatment, as
Wisconsin's WFEA openly attempts, takes the spirit of Green and the

use of disparate impact analysis with respect to criminal record
considerations much too far. In Green, the Eighth Circuit of the United

States Court of Appeals appropriately denied using Title VII disparate
impact analysis to make unlawful any and all uses of criminal records as
362. See Olson, supra note 286, at A23:
Advocates of compulsory felon-hiring sometimes portray critics in the role of the
vengeful Inspector Javert of "Les Miserables." To give employers more freedom in
these matters would be to "deny someone a reason to earn a living forever," says
Wisconsin state Sen. Gwen Moore (D., Milwaukee). "This says they can never be
rehabilitated." That might be a fair criticism of a law that required employers to
reject convicts.
Id.; see also Hruz, supra note 123, at 12-14.
363. See Olson, supra note 286, at A23 ("[T]he issue here is whether each employer
should be free to weigh the pros and (so to speak) cons for himself."). There is also an
argument that employers which rationally hire qualified individuals with conviction records
unrelated to the job performed will economically benefit. See Funk, supra note 248, at 93133. "[T]hose employers who do not harbor irrational biases will gain a competitive advantage
over their biased competitors as a result of the reduced labor cost that the former will enjoy."
Id. at 931 (citing GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 39-41 (2d ed.
1971)).
364. Of course, due consideration must be given to negligent hiring claims. See supra
Part III.A.4.
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a factor in employment decisions. 65 While the theory behind disparate
impact analysis under Title VII has some legitimate problems of its
own," it is still a more preferable mechanism to addressing the
permissibility of conviction record considerations during employment
decisions than WFEA's direct listing of conviction records.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court's holding in County of Milwaukee
was certainly a step in the right direction toward discrediting unabated
employment protection for formerly convicted criminals. The court
recognized that the interests of employers and their associates demands
a clear test expounding the application of the substantial relation
defense.3 6 Yet state courts, even the Wisconsin Supreme Court, are
bound to interpret the law as created by the legislature, and as such they
could not "eviscerate" the WFEA criminal record provision .3' The next
step should be the actual deletion of the provision from statutory law.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Wisconsin Fair Employment Act's criminal record provision is
neither desirable nor necessary. It is undesirable because it specifically
confers upon persons with conviction records the status of a protected
class under employment discrimination law. Instead, a mutable trait
that is widely recognized as being negative, such as an individual's
evidenced involvement in criminal activity, should not be placed on the
same plane as other bases of discrimination derived from immutable and
non-nefarious traits, such as race, sex, and the other common suspect
classes protected under discrimination law.
To the extent that
consideration of conviction records should be restricted in employment

365. Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 549 F.2d 1158, 1160 (8th Cir. 1977); see also supra Part
II.C.2.
366. For a thorough analysis and critique of disparate impact theory with regard to
employment discrimination laws, see generally EPSTEIN, supra note 161, at 182-241:
[D]isparate impact cases, which allow courts to infer unlawful discrimination, wholly
without evidence of improper motive, and solely from the (perceived) disparate
consequences of certain hiring tests or procedures, represent a very different threat
[than disparate treatment cases], one that poses intolerable and unnecessary
demands on both the legal system and the affected employment markets.
Id. at 160.
367. County of Milwaukee v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 407 N.W.2d 908, 917
(Wis. 1987).
368. But cf Myers, supra note 43, at 891 (claiming the County of Milwaukee majority
eviscerated the WFEA conviction record statute).
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decisions, it should be done only in a manner closely tied to the use of
this one factor as a means to deny employment to racial minorities. The
law is also undesirable because it attempts to devise a balancing test of
some type, any one of which seems terribly unworkable in a consistent
and principled manner.
The law is unnecessary since deletion of the WFEA's criminal record
provision would immediately pass on to employees the protection still
available under federal law, as found in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
Title VII law only concerns itself with discrimination based on
conviction records to the extent that these policies may
disproportionately restrict the employment opportunities of minorities.
As a result, this protection makes the subtle yet important distinction
between the effect an employer's policy may have on classes truly
deserving of employment protection, such as racial minorities, as
opposed to the direct protection of criminals qua criminals. For these
primary reasons, Wisconsin lawmakers should feel comfortable in
deleting from the WFEA its conviction record provision, and thereby
alleviating the courts of the burden of attempting to enforce its nebulous
mandates.
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